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Abstract. The paper surveys the literature on high-level name-passing process
calculi, and their extensions with cryptographic primitives. The survey is by no
means exhaustive, for essentially two reasons. First, in trying to provide a coher-
ent presentation of different ideas and techniques, one inevitably ends up leaving
out the approaches that do not ﬁt the intended roadmap. Secondly, the literature
on the subject has been growing at very high rate over the years. As a conse-
quence, we decided to concentrate on few papers that introduce the main ideas,
in the hope that discussing them in some detail will provide sufﬁcient insight for
further reading.
Outline of the Paper
We start in Section 1 with a brief review of a polyadic version of Milner’s π-calculus.
Then we outline the foundational work by Pierce and Sangiorgi on typing systems for
the π-calculus. Section 3 coversthe Join Calculus, and a discussion on its type systems.
The remaining sections cover security speciﬁc extensions of name-passing calculi. In
Section 4 we review an extension of the π-calculus with a new construct for group
creation,andstudythe impactofthe newprimitivein enforcingsecrecy.InSection 5we
discuss the security π-calculus, a typed version of the asynchronous π-calculus, which
applies type based techniques provide security resource access control and information
ﬂow security guarantees. Section 6 gives a brief outline of a value passing extension
of CCS, known as CryptoSPA, with cryptographic primitives. Finally, Section 7 covers
the spi-calculus, and its typing system(s) for secrecy. Each section includes pointers to
further important work in the literature relevant to each of the topics.
1 The Pi Calculus
The π-calculusis a way of describingand analyzingsystems consisting of agentswhich
interact among each other, and whose conﬁguration is continually changing. The π-
calculus emerged as the canonical model of concurrent computation, in much the same
way as the λ-calculus has established itself as the canonical model of functional com-
putation.
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The λ-calculus emphasizes the view of computation as the process of taking ar-
guments and yielding results. In the λ-calculus everything is a function, and compu-
tation is, essentially, the result of function application. Concurrent computation can-
not be forced into this functional metaphor of computation without severe distortions:
if anything, functional computation is a special case of concurrent computation, and
one should reasonably expect to ﬁnd the functional model represented within a general
enough model of concurrency.
Inthe π-calculus,everyterm denotesa process– a computationalactivity runningin
parallelwith otherprocessesand possiblycontainingseveralindependentsubprocesses.
Computation arises as a result of process interaction, which in turns is based on com-
munication on named channels. Naming is, in fact, the pervasive notion of the calculus,
for various reasons. Naming presupposes independence:one naturally assumes that the
namer and the named are independent (concurrent) entities. Further, using a name, or
address, is a prerequisite to the act of communicating, and of locating and modifying
data.
Based on these observations, the π-calculus seeks ways to treat data-access and
communicationasthesame thing:indoingso, itpresupposesthatnamingof channelsis
primitive, while naming of agents is not. As we shall see, departing from this view, and
extendingthe conceptof naming to agents and locations is what led to the development
of models of mobility on top of the π-calculus. As of now, however, we start looking at
the π-calculus in itself.
1.1 Syntax and Operational Semantics
There are in fact several versions of the π-calculus. Here, we will concentrate on a very
basic one, although polyadic: the differences with other versions are mostly orthogonal
to our concerns. The syntax is given in Table 1.
We assume an inﬁnite set of names to be used for values and communication chan-
nels, and an inﬁnite set of variables. We let a,b− p,q range over names and x−z
range over variables. In addition, we often reserve u and v to denote names or vari-
ables indistinguishably, whenever the distinction between the two notions may safely
be disregarded.
We use a number of notation conventions: ˜ x : ˜ T stands for x1 : T1,...,xk : Tk,a n d
we omit trailing dead processes, writing u N  for u N .0 and u(˜ x : ˜ T) for u(˜ x : ˜ T).0.
The empty tuple plays the role of synchronization messages. The input preﬁx and the
restriction operator are binders: the notations fn(P) and fv(P) indicate, respectively,
the set of free names and free variables of the process P: these notions are deﬁned as
usual. We assume identity for α-convertible terms throughout, and we often omit type
annotations on the two binders whenever irrelevant to the context in question.
The syntactic form 0 denotes the inert process, which does nothing. u(x : T)P is
a process that waits to read a value on the channel u: having received a value, say
M, it behaves as P with every free occurrence of x substituted by M. Dually, u M .P
is a process that sends a value M on channel u and then behaves as P. The syntax
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Table 1 Pi calculus (typed) syntax
Expressions M,N ::= bv basic value
 a,...,p name
 x,...,z variable
 (M1,...,Mk) tuple, k  0
Processes P,Q,R ::= 0 stop
 u N .P output
 u(˜ x : ˜ T).P input
 (νa : T)P restriction
 P | P composition
 !P replication
the process the outputu M  must be consumed by another process running in parallel1.
The restriction form (νa : T)P declares a new, fresh name a local to P. P | Q denotes
the parallel composition of two subprocesses P and Q. Finally, !P stands for an inﬁnite
number of (parallel) copies of P.
The operationalsemantics of the π-calculusis deﬁnedin terms of two relations: a struc-
tural equivalence relation on process terms that allows the rearrangement of parallel
compositions, replications and restrictions so that the participants in a communication
can be broughtinto immediate proximity;and a reduction relation that describes the act
of communication itself.
Structural Congruence is deﬁned as the least congruence relation that is closed un-
der the following rules:
1. P | Q ≡ Q | P, P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R, P | 0 ≡ P
2. (νa)0 ≡ 0, (νa)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(νa)P
3. (νa)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νa)Q if a  ∈ fn(P)
4. !P ≡!P | P
The one-step reduction relation P −→ Q is the least relation closed under rules in
Table 2.
ThenotationP{x1 :=M1,...xk :=Mk}indicatesthesimultaneoussubstitutionofMi
foreachfreeoccurrenceofthevariablexi inP,fori∈[1..k].We assumethatsubstitution
maps variables to names (or else unstructured values). In other words, the substitution
{x1 := M1,...xk := Mk} is only deﬁned when each of the Mi is either a name or a basic
value. In all other cases it is undeﬁned.
The rule (COMM) is the core of reduction relation, as it deﬁnes the effect of syn-
chronization between two processes on a channel. The rules (STRUCT) complete the
deﬁnition. Notice that reduction is possible under a restriction, but not under either
1 There exists an asynchronous variant of the calculus in which output is non-blocking. We
will discuss it brieﬂy below, and return on it in later sections, when discussing some of the
derivative calculi.94 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 2 Reduction Relation
(COMMUNICATION)
n(x1 : T1,...,xk : Tk)P | n M1,...,Mk .Q −→ P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}|Q
(STRUCTURAL RULES)
P −→ P 
P | Q −→ P  | Q
P −→ P 
(νa)P −→ (νa)P 
P ≡ P  P  −→ Q  Q  ≡ Q
P −→ Q
of the two input and output preﬁx forms. It is also instructive to comment on the last
structural rule for reduction, that connects the relations of reduction and structural con-
gruence, and speciﬁcally on the interplay between the reduction rule (COMM)a n dt h e
structural rule (νa)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νa)Q if a  ∈ fn(P), known as the rule of scope extru-
sion. If we read the equivalence from left to right there is nothing surprising: since the
name a does not occur free in P, restricting a on this process is vacuous, and we may
safely move the restriction to Q without changing (at least intuitively) the meaning of
the term. When used from right to left, instead, the equivalence enables the communi-
cation of private names. Consider the term c(x).P | (νa)c a .Q. In their current form,
the two parallel processesmay notcommunicate.However,we may use the congruence
rules to rearrangethe term as in (νa)(c(x).P | c a .Q), and then use (COMM) to reduce
it to P{x := a}|Q. By effect of the reduction, the name a, which was private to Q,h a s
now been communicated to P. Interestingly, the name a may very well be the name of
a channel, which implies that the reduction has the effect of establishing a new com-
munication link between the two processes P and Q. Also note that the new link is now
private to P and Q, and will remainso as long as the two processes do not communicate
it to third parties.
This simple example shows that the combination of scope extrusion and communi-
cation provides a very powerful mechanism for:
– dynamically changing the topological structure of a system of processes, by creat-
ing new, fresh, communication links.
– establishing private,hence secure communicationlinksamongthe principalsofthe
system.
The ability to represent dynamically changing system topologies is the distinctive fea-
ture of the π-calculus with respect to previous CCS-like calculi for concurrency. The
possibility of establishing private channels, in turn, makes the π-calculus a good foun-
dation for studying formal models of security protocols. We brieﬂy illustrate this po-
tential of the π-calculus with a simpliﬁed version of the protocol known as the Wide
Mouthed Frog protocol. In this version, we have two principals A and B (the outfamous
Alice and Bob), willing to exchange secret data M,a n das e r v e rS, that mediates their
communication:
Message 1: A → Sc AB on cAS
Message 2: S → Bc AB on cBS
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Initially, each one of A and B shares a channel with S. A sends to S a secret channel that
it wishes to use for communicate with B; S sends this channel to B and then A and B
may communicate. The π-calculus formulation of the protocolis just as direct, but now
formal:
A  (νcAB)cAS cAB .cAB M 
S  cAS(x).cBS x 
B  cBS(x).x(y).P{y}
The notation P{y} is used here simply to emphasize that P will do something with the
message it receives on the input channel x. The example shows how a secret channel
may be established for communication, and relies critically on scope extrusion: the
scoping rules guarantee that the context in which the protocol is executed (i.e. any
process runningin parallel with A, B and S) will not be able to access the secret channel
cAB, unless of course any of the principals involved in the protocol gives it away.
This use of private channels for secrecy is suggestive and effective in its simplicity.
On the other hand, a problem with the π-calculus formulation of the protocol arises
when we consider its implementationin a distributed environment.In that case, it is not
realistic to rely only on the scope rules to ensure secrecy of names, as one also needs to
prevent the context from having free access public channels over which private names
are communicated.In our example,the name cAB is secret, but to guaranteethat secrecy
is preserved through the protocol we should also envisage a mechanism for prevent-
ing the context from reading the name cAB while it is communicated over the public
channels cAS and cBS. Unfortunately, the π-calculus does not allow one to express the
cryptographic operations that would typically be used for that purpose. This observa-
tion motivated the design of the cryptographicextension of the π-calculusknown as the
spi calculus [5,10].
We conclude the description of the untyped π-calculus with a more complex exam-
ple that illustrates the reduction semantics and the computational ﬂavor of the calculus.
Example 1 (Memory Cells). A memory cell can abstractly be thought of as an object
with private store s holding the cell value, and two methodsget and put for reading and
writing the contents of the cell. In the π-calculus, this can be represented as a process
consisting of three parallel subprocesses like the ones displayed below:
cell(n) ::=( νs)(s n 
| !get(y).s(x).(s x |y x )
| !put(y,v).s(x).(s v |y  ))
cell(n) declares the private name s representing the physical location holding the value
n, and provides the two handlers for serving the “get” and “put” requests on its con-
tents. Both the handlers are implemented as replicated processes, to make it possible
to serve multiple requests. Each request is served by ﬁrst spawning a fresh copy of the
corresponding handler by means of the congruence rule !P ≡ P | !P.
The intuition is as follows. To read the cell contents, a user sends a “get” request
by transmitting, over the channel get, the name of a channel where it waits for the
result of the request. Upon receiving the channel name, the “get” handler inside the
cell consumes the current cell value, and then reinstates it while also copying it to the96 Michele Bugliesi et al.
channel it received from the user. The protocol for serving a “put” request is similar.
The cell’s“put” handlerwaits for a forvalue v:oncev is received,the handlerconsumes
the current cell value and writes v on the private channel s. There is a further subtlety,
however, in that the “put” handler inside the cell also expects an “ack” channel from
the user, which it uses to signal the completion of the protocol to the user. This may be
required by a user that, say, increments the cell value and then reads the new value to
printit: beforereadingthe value,the user may use the ack channelto make sure it prints
the new cell value, the one resulting from the increment.
Here, we illustrate the reduction semantics with a simpler (and less realistic) user:
user(v) ::=( νack)(put ack,v .ack().(νret)get ret .ret(x).print x )
The user ﬁrst writes a new value and then reads the cell contents to print the returned
value. Now consider the system cell(0) | user(v). An initial phase of structural rear-
rangements brings the system in the form (νs)(νack)(νret)(...)cell | (...)user.T h e n
the system (...)cell | (...)user evolves as follows: we omit the application of congru-
ence rules and, at each reduction step, we only display the subterms that are relevant to
the reduction in question:
(s 0 |(put(y,v).s(x).... | ...))cell | (put ack,1 ....)user
−→ (s 0 |s(x).(s 1 |ack  ) | ...))cell | (ack()....)user
−→ (s 1 |ack   | ...)cell | (ack().ret(x)....)user
−→ (s 1 |(get(y).s(x)....))cell | (get ret ....)user
−→ (s 1 |(s(x).(s x |ret x )...))cell | ret(x).print x 
−→ (s 1 |ret 1 ...)cell | ret(x).print x 
−→ (s 1 |...)cell | print 1    
1.2 Further Reading
Starting with the original presentation [46], there is by now an extensive literature on
the π-calculus, also in the form of introductory [45], and advanced [54]. Most versions
of the π-calculus, including the one we have outlined here, are ﬁrst-order in that they
allow onlynames to be transmittedoverchannels. Higher-orderversionsof the calculus
have been extensively studied by Sangiorgi [54].
2 Typing and Subtyping for the Pi Calculus
We have so far ignored the typing annotations occurring in the input and restriction
binders. Now we take them more seriously, and look at the rˆ ole of types in the calculus.
There are in fact several reasons why types are useful for processcalculi in general, and
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– The theory of the pure (untyped)π-calculusis often insufﬁcient to prove some “ex-
pected” propertiesof processes. These properties arise typically from the program-
mer using names according to some intended principle or logical discipline which,
however, does not appear anywhere in the terms of the pure π-calculus, and there-
fore cannot be used in proofs. Types bring the intended structure back into light,
and therefore enhance formal reasoning on process terms: for instance, typed be-
havioral equivalencesare easier to prove,based on the fact that only typed contexts
need to be considered.
– types may be employed to ensure that process interaction happens only in type-
consistent ways, and hence to enable static detection of run-time type errors. To
exemplify, consider the following two terms:
a b,c .P | a(x).Q a true .P | a(x).x(y).Q
Both terms are, at least intuitively, ill-formed. The ﬁrst reduces to the non-sensical
process  b,c (x).Q, while the second to the ill-formed term true(y).Q As i m p l e
arity check would be enough to rule out the ﬁrst term as ill-formed. This, however,
is not true of the second term.
– types can be useful for resource control. In the π-calculus, resources are channels,
and the way that resources can be protected from unintended use is by hiding their
names by means of the restriction operator. However, this is often too coarse a
policy to enable effective resources control. In the untyped calculus, resource pro-
tection is lost whenthe resourcename is transmitted,as noassumptioncanbe made
on how the recipient of the name will use the resource. Types may come to the res-
cue, as they can be employed to express and enforce a restrictive use of channels
by associating them with read and/or write capabilities.
The study of type systems for process calculi originated from ideas by Milner [42,43],
based on the observation that channels used in system of processes naturally obey a
discipline in the values they carry, that reﬂects their intended use. For instance, in the
cell example above, the ret channel is used to communicate integers, while the get
channel is used to communicate another channel (in fact, the ret channel). In Milner’s
original formulation, the cell example could be described by the following sorting:
ret : Si Si  → int
get : Sg Sg  → (Si)
ack : Sa Sa  → ()
put : Sp Sp  → (Sa,())
The key idea, in types systems for the π-calculus, is that sorts, or types, are assigned
only to channels, whereas processes are either well typed under a particular set of as-
sumptionsfortheir boundandfreenamesandvariables,ortheyarenot.Aswe shallsee,
a differentapproachispossible, basedon assigningmoreinformativetypesto processes
to describe various forms of process behavior. For the time being, however, we look at
typingsystems where the rˆ ole of typesis essentially that of describing(and prescribing)
the intended use of channels.98 Michele Bugliesi et al.
The foundationalwork on type system by Pierce and Sangiorgi[47]was inspired by
Milner’s initial idea, which they elaborate in two dimensions. First they replace match-
ing of types “by-name” with a more direct notion of structural matching, a technical
modiﬁcation that enables a substantively more concise and elegant presentation. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, they employ types in a prescriptive manner to control and
restrict access to channels. Their technique is based on associating channels with ca-
pabilities, and on introducing a notion of subtyping to gain additional control over the
use processes can make of channels. The rest of this section gives an overview of their
work. The reader is referred to [47] for full details.
2.1 Types
The structure of types is described by the following productions.
Types S,T ::= B types of basic values
 (T1,...,Tk) tuple, k  0
 r(T) input channel
 w(T) output channel
 rw(T) input/output channel
The type of a channel not only describes the type T of the values it carries, but also
the kind of access the channel offers to its users. In the untyped calculus every channel
is available for input and output: types help distinguishing, and restricting, the use of
channels by associating them with access capabilities, providing users with the right to
read from and/or write to a channel. The distinction between the two forms of access
is reminiscent of a corresponding distinction that is made for the reference types in
some functional programminglanguages. Reference types, that is, the types of mutable
cells, are modeled with two different types: one for use of cells as “sources” of values,
from which values can be read, and the other for cells as “sinks” where values can
be placed. The same intuition applies to channels: channels of type r(T) may only be
used as sources (i.e. for input), channels of type w(T) as sinks (i.e. for output), whereas
channels of type rw(T) are input-outputchannels behaving both as sources and sinks.
To exemplify, r(int) is a read-only channel carrying values of type int. Since chan-
nels themselves are values, one can deﬁne a typed channel c : rw(r(int)), conferring
c the capability of sending and receiving values which in turn are read-only channels
carrying integers.
2.2 Typing Rules
The typing rules are given in Table 3. They derive judgments in two forms: Γ   M : T
stating that term M has type T,a n dΓ   P which simply says the process P is well-
typed in context,o rtype environment Γ. A type environment Γ contains a set of type
assumptions for the free names and variables occurring in P: equivalently, one may
think of Γ as a ﬁnite map from names and variables to types.
The rules (BASE)a n d( T UPLE) should be self-explained. The (NAME) rule depends
on the subtype relation S  T which we discuss below: if the name (or variable) u is
a s s u m e dt oh a v et y p eS in Γ, then any occurrenceof that name in a process may also beA Survey of Name-Passing Calculi and Crypto-Primitives 99
Table 3 Typing Rules for the Pi Calculus
Typing of Terms
(BASE)
Γ   bv : B
(NAME)
Γ(u)=SS  T
Γ   u : T
(TUPLE)
Γ   Mi : Ti i ∈ [1..k]
Γ   (M1,...,Mk) : (T1,...,Tk)
Typing of Processes
(INPUT)
Γ   u : r( ˜ T) Γ, ˜ x : ˜ T   P ˜ x∩Dom(Γ)=∅
Γ   u(˜ x : ˜ T).P
(OUTPUT)
Γ   u : w(T) Γ   M : T Γ   P
Γ   u M .P
(DEAD)
Γ   0
(PAR)
Γ   P Γ   Q
Γ   P | Q
(REPL)
Γ   P
Γ  !P
(RESTR)
Γ,a : T   Pa  ∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ   (νa : T)P
Table 4 Core Subtype rules for channel types
(SUB INPUT)
S  T
r(S)  r(T)
(SUB OUTPUT)
T  S
w(S)  w(T)
(SUB IO/I)
rw(T)  r(T)
(SUB IO/O)
rw(T)  w(T)
typedatT providedthatT isa super-typeofS.The(INPUT)a n d(O UTPUT)rulesensure
thatchannelsareusedconsistentlywiththeirtypes.Inthe(INPUT)rule,theﬁrstpremise
requires that the channel from which input is requested provide a read capability and
that the type of the input variables of the channel be consistent with the channel type.
In addition, in order for the process u(˜ x : ˜ T).P to be well typed, the continuationP must
also be well typed under the additional assumptions that the input variables ˜ x are of
the declared types. The rule (OUTPUT) has a similar reading. The remaining rules are
easily explained: (PAR)a n d( R EPL) are purely structural, (DEAD) states that the inert
process is well typed, and (RESTR) is standard.
2.3 Subtyping
The subtype relation is central to the use of the type system to enforce access control
over channels. The core subtyping rules are deﬁned in Table 4. The subtype relation
is the least reﬂexive and transitive relation that is closed under these rules, and a rule
that extends the subtype relation homomorphicallyto tuples: (S1,...,Sk)  (T1,...,Tk)
if Si  Ti for all i ∈ [1..k].
The two rules (SUB INPUT)a n d( S UB OUTPUT) are readily understood by analogy
between channel types and reference types. Alternatively, one may think of a channel
as a function: in its role as a source the channel returns a value, in its role as a sink it100 Michele Bugliesi et al.
receives argument. Now, the two rules reﬂect the subtype relation for function types:
covariant in their return type and contra-variant in their input. The rules (SUB IO/I)
and (SUB IO/O) enable access control: any channel (which in the untyped calculus is
always available for both input and output) may be associated with a more restrictive
type(read-onlyorwrite-only)toprotectit frommisuseincertainsituations.Toillustrate
the power of subtyping for resource access control, consider the following example
from [47].
Example 2 (Access to a Printer). Suppose we have a system with a printer P and two
clientsC1 andC2. The printerprovidesa requestchannel p carryingvaluesof some type
T representingdata to be printedon behalfofthe clients. Thesystem canbe represented
by the π-calculus process (νp : rw(T))(P | C1 | C2).
If we take, say, C1  p j1 .p j2 ...., one would expect that the jobs j1, j2,... are
received and processed, in that order, by the printer P. This is not necessarily the case,
however, as C2 might be not be willing to comply with the rules of the protocol. For
instance, it competes with P to “steal” the jobs sent by C1 and throws them away:
C2 !p(j : T).0.
One can prevent this kind of misbehavior by constraining the capabilities offered to
C1 andC2 on the channel p: in the end, the clients should only write on p, whereas the
printer should only read from it. We may therefore extend the system with an initializa-
tion phase that enforces this intended behavior on all the participants in the protocol.
The initialization phase uses two channels, a and b, to communicate the name p to the
printer and to the two clients, restricting the respective capabilities on p.
(νp : rw(T)) (a p .b p |a(x : r(T)).P | b(y : w(T)).(C1 |C2))
Notice that now p is a read-only channel within P and a write-only channel within C1
and C2. Assuming appropriate deﬁnitions for the processes P, C1 and C2, the system
type checks, under the assumption a,b : rw(rw(T)), as the subtype relation ensures that
p : rw(T) may legally be substituted for any x : r(T) or y : w(T).
2.4 Properties of the Type System
Thetypesystem satisﬁesthestandardpropertiesoneexpects:subjectreductionandtype
safety. In functional languages, subject reduction guarantees that types are preserved
during the computation. The result for the π-calculus is similar, and ensures that well-
typedness is preserved by all the non-deterministic reductions of a process.
Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction). If Γ   P and P −→ Q, then Γ   Q.
The proof of this result requires two auxiliary results. The ﬁrst is the so-called subject-
congruence theorem, stating that well-typedness is preserved by the relation of struc-
tural congruence.
Theorem 2 (Subject Congruence). If Γ   P and P ≡ Q, then Γ   Q. Dually, if Γ   P
and Q ≡ P, then Γ   Q.
The second is the π-calculus version of the familiar substitution lemma from type sys-
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Theorem 3 (Substitution). If Γ   u : T and Γ,x : T   P, then Γ   P{x := u}.
Type safety is a more subtle issue. In functional calculi, proving type safety amounts to
proving the so-called absence of stuck states, i.e. to show that the evaluation of well-
typed terms either does not terminate, or returns a value, for a suitable notion of value.
In the π-calculus, there is no notion of value, as computation is entirely based on in-
teraction between processes, that do not return values. A notion of “stuck state” may
nevertheless be formulated, and taken as the basic common denominator to different
notions of type safety.
Theorem 4 (Basic Type Safety).Assume Γ P, andP −→ Q. IfQ containsasubterm
c(x1 : T1,...,xn : Tn).Q1 | c M1,...,Mk .Q2
then all of the following hold true: c is a name or variable (i.e. not a constant of basic
type), k = n and each of the Mi is a non-structured value.
The theorem says essentially that process interaction happens in type-consistent ways,
and never generates undeﬁned substitutions. In addition, one may wish to prove other
propertiesforreduction,andconsequentlyrichernotionsoftypesafety.Forinstance,for
the type system we have presented in the previous section, it can be proved that reduc-
tion of well-typed processes preserves guarantees that access to channels by processes
is always consistent with the capabilities conferred to the channels by their types. We
will discuss type-safetymore formallyin some of the calculi presentedin later sections.
Presently, we content ourselves with this informal formulation, and refer the interested
reader to [47] for details on this richer notion of type safety.
2.5 Further Reading
The study of type systems for the π-calculus is currently very active, and has produced
a large body of literature. Besides the work by Pierce and Sangiorgi we have reviewed
in this section, and those we will discuss later on, an interesting pointer is to the work
of Igarashi and Kobayashi [37] where a generic framework is proposed in which to
understand several previous systems.
3 The Join Calculus
The Join calculus [29,30] is a variant of the asynchronous π-calculus [12,36] which
combinesrestriction,reception,andreplicationin oneconstruct,thejoin receptor:J P.
For example the deﬁnition
def apply f,x  f x  (1)
deﬁnesa new nameapplythat receivestwo argumentsandapplythe ﬁrst to the second.
More precisely it receives a channel name that it bounds to f and a name that it bounds
to x and sends the latter over the former. This is more formally shown by the following
reduction:
def apply f,x  f x in apply g,y − →def apply f,x  f x in g y 102 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 5 The Join calculus
Processes P,Q ::= x  V  Asynchronous message on x
def D in P Deﬁnition of D in P
P | Q Parallel Composition
0 Empty Process
Join patterns J,J  ::= x ˜ y  Asynchronous reception on x
J | J  Joining messages
Deﬁnition D,E ::= J P Elementary clause
D∧E Simultaneous deﬁnition
Values V,V  ::= ˜ x Names
Table 6 Received, deﬁned and free variables
dv(J P)= dv(J) dv(D∧E)=dv(D)∪dv(E)
dv(T)= / 0 dv(J | J )= dv(J)∪dv(J )
dv(x ˜ v )= {x}
rv(x ˜ v )= {u | u ∈ ˜ v} rv(J | J )= rv(J) rv(J )
fv(J P)= dv(J)∪(fv(P)−rv(J)) fv(D∧E)= fv(D)∪fv(E)
fv(ε)= / 0
fv(x ˜ v )= {x}∪{u ∈ ˜ v}
fv(def D in P)=( fv(P)∪fv(D))−dv(D)
fv(P | Q)= fv(P)∪fv(Q)
fv(0)= / 0
The syntax of the calculus is given in Table 5, where we assume names x,y,...to be
drafted from an inﬁnite set N .
Theonlybindingmechanismisthe join pattern:the formalparameterswhichare re-
ceived are boundin the guardedprocess.The received variables, rv(J), are the namesto
whichthemessagessentarebound;thedeﬁned variablesin ajoinpatternora deﬁnition,
dv(J) and dv(D), are the names which are bound by the deﬁnition. The free variables,
fv(P) and fv(D), are all the names which are not bound. Received, deﬁned and free
variables can be easily deﬁned as expected by structural induction (see Table 6).
It is important to notice that there is no linearity condition on the channel names in
a composedjoin pattern: however,elementaryjoin patterns are requiredto be linear,i.e.
received variables are supposed to be pairwise distinct. A name is said to be fresh in a
process when it is not free in it. In the following discussions a consistent use of names
is assumed.
The operationalsemanticsof the Join calculusis given usingthe chemicalparadigm
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Table 7 The RCHAM
(str-join) |= P | Q  |= P,Q
(str-def) |= def D in P  Dσdv |= Pσdv
(red) ...∧J P∧...|= Jσrv → ...∧J P∧...|= Pσrv
Side conditions:i n(str-def) σdv instantiates the names in dv(D) to distinct fresh names;
in (red) σrv substitutes the received variables rv(J) with the values actually received
stract Machine (RCHAM) [29,14] (see Table 7). States of the RCHAM are expression
of the form D |= P,w h e r eP are the running processes and D are the (chemical) reac-
tions.
Note that join patterns can be the parallel composition of different receptions, and
that reduction takes place only when all the receptions synchronize.So for example the
following receptor
def ready printer |print file  printer file in P
reduces only when in P two (unbound) outputs on ready and print occur in parallel
as for
def ready printer |print file  printer file in ready gutenberg 
| print myths.ps |Q
which reduces to
def ready printer |print file  printer file in gutenberg myths.ps |Q
The same behavior could be obtained by composing this deﬁnition with the deﬁni-
tion (1):
def apply f,x  f x ∧ready p |print f  apply p, f 
3.1 Typing
Let us again consider the deﬁnition of the expression (1). If we use  T  to denote the
type of channels transporting values of type T,t h e napply has type   T ,T  for every
type T. In words apply is a channel that transports pairs formed by a channel and a
value that can be sent over that channel.
Note the polymorphic nature of the type of apply. This can be formally expressed
by generalizing the type of apply into the following type schema: ∀α.  α ,α .W e
saw before that join calculus provides synchronization between join patterns. Thus for
instance a variant of apply that receives f and x from different sources can be deﬁned
as follows
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Table 8 Typing rules for the Join Calculus
(INST)
x : ∀˜ α.T ∈ A
A   x : T{˜ α := ˜ T }
(PAR)
A   PA   Q
A   P | Q
(MESSAGE)
A   x :  T1,...,Tn  A   vi : Ti (i = 1..n)
A   x v1,...,vn 
(DEF)
A,B   D :: BA ,Gen(B,A)   P
A   def D in P
(JOIN)
A,yij: T
i=1..n,j=1..mi
ij   P
A   x1 y
j=1..m1
1j  |... | xn y
j=1..mn
nj   P :: xi :  Ti1,...Timi i=1..n
(AND)
A   D1 :: B1 A   D2 :: B2
(B1
Dom(B2)
= B2
Dom(B1)
)
A   D1∧D2 :: B1,B2
According to what we said before fun and arg can be respectively typed as   α  
and  α . Observe, however, that fun and arg are correlated in their types as they must
share the same type variable α. This forbids to generalize their types separately: if
we assigned them the types ∀α.  α   and ∀α. α , then the correlation of the types of
the two names deﬁned in the same join pattern would be lost. In [14] this problem is
handled by the deﬁnition of the generalization rule that forbids the generalization of
type variables that appear free in the type of more than one co-deﬁned name.
The type system of [14] is deﬁned as follows:
Types T ::= α T,...,T 
Schemas σ ::= T  ∀α.σ
Type Envs B ::= ∅  B,x : T
Schema Envs A ::= ∅  A,x : σ
The type system includes three kinds of typing judgments:
A   u:T the name u has type T in A
A   P the process P is well typed in A
A   D :: B the deﬁnition D is well-typed in A with types B for its deﬁned types
which are deduced by the typing rules in Table 8.
In that table, Gen(B,A) is the generalization of the type environment B of the form
(xi : Ti)i=1..n with respect to the schema environment A:l e tfv(A) be the set
∪(s:σ)∈Avars(σ) with vars(σ) is the set of variables occurring in σ;l e tB\x be the
environment B without the binding for x;t h e nGen(B,A) is (xi : ∀(fv(Ti)−fv(A,(B\
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With the exception of (DEF) all the rules are straightforward, insofar as they are al-
most directlyinspired by the typingrules for polymorphic(poliadic)λ-calculus. (INST)
assigns to a variablex any type that is an instance of the type schema associated to the x
in A;( P AR) is straightforward; (MESSAGE) checks that the types of the actual parame-
ters match the type of the channel the parameters are sent over; (JOIN) checks that the
guarded process P is typable under the assumption that the types of the formal param-
eters of the join patterns match those of the corresponding channels, and associates to
the deﬁnitionthe type environmentof its declarednames; (AND) associates to the com-
position of two deﬁnitions the composition of the type environments of their declared
names, providedthat the two deﬁnitions do not declare a commonname. Finally (DEF)
is the most technical rule: ﬁrst it checks the typing of the deﬁnition D under the type
environmentproducedby D. Thisallowsrecursivedeﬁnitions;secondit checksthe well
typing of P under the generalizationof the types of the new deﬁnition with respect to A.
In particular the generalization takes into account the problem of sharing we hinted in
the beginning of the section. Therefore for every constraint x:T ∈ B the generalization
does not generalize all the free type variables of T but, instead, only those free vari-
ables that are not shared with a previousdeﬁnitionor with a parameterof the actual join
pattern.
3.2 Properties of the Type System
Soundness. The soundness of the type system is obtained by proving subject reduction
and basic type safety (correspondingto Theorem 4 for π-calculus.)
Theorem 5 (Subject Reduction). If A   P and P −→ Q, then A   Q.
Deﬁnition 1. A process of the form def D∧J   in Q | x ˜ v  is wrong if J contains a
message x ˜ y  where ˜ y and ˜ v have different arities.
Theorem 6 (Basic Type Safety). If A   P then P is not wrong.
The composition of the previous two theorems ensures that well typed processes never
go wrong.
Type Inference. Finally, there exists an algorithm that for every typable process returns
the most general schema environment under which the process can be typed, while it
fails if it is applied to a process that is not typable.
3.3 Further Reading
In [7] Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier deﬁne the sjoin-calculus, that extends the join cal-
culus with constructs for encryption and decryption and with names that can be used
as keys, nonces, or other tags. This extension is very reminiscent of the the way the
spi-calculus (see section 7) extends the π-calculus: as a matter of fact, the name sjoin
was chosen in analogy with spi. The authors also show how to translate sjoin into a
lower-level language that includes cryptographic primitives mapping communication
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theorem for the translation ensures that one can reason about programs in sjoin with-
out mentioning the cryptographic protocols used to implement them in the lower-level
implementation.
In [17] Conchon and Pottier advocate that the the type system of [14], that forbids
the generalizationof any type variable that is shared between two jointly deﬁned names
(suchas fun and arg), isoverlyrestrictivewhenonewantstousetypesinadescriptive–
rather then prescriptive– way. To that end they switch from the system of [14] in which
the generalization is performed on syntactic criteria, to a richer type system based on
constraints and where the generalization is more “semantic” (polymorphic types are
interpreted as particular sets of monomorphictypes) and fairly natural. However,rather
surprisingly, the new generalization criterion hinders type inference as it results very
difﬁcult (perhaps impossible) to infer a most general type. As a result they propose a
more restrictive (and syntactic) criterion that, while it allows type inference, it is closer
to the original system of [14].
In his PhD. thesis [15] Conchon extends the type system of JOIN(X) with informa-
tion-ﬂow annotations that ensure a noninterference property based on bisimilarity
equivalences. The new systems thus obtained can detect, for instance, information ﬂow
caused by contentionson distributed resources, which are not detected, in a satisfactory
way, when using testing equivalences. The achievement is however limited by the fact
that equivalences, rather than congruences, are considered.
A more in depth study of bisimulation for the join calculus can be found in [11].
In all these variants, join remains a concurrent calculus. In [31] the authors deﬁne
the Distributed Join Calculus that extends join calculus essential with locations, mi-
gration, and failure. The new calculus allows one to express mobile agents roaming
on the net, that is, that autonomously move from some node to a different node where
they resume their current execution. Distributed join is also the core of the distributed
language jocaml[16].
4 The Pi Calculus with Groups
In Section 1 (and we will see it also in Section 7) we discussed the importance of scope
extrusion for secrecy. However, inattentive use of scope extrusion may cause secrets to
be leaked. Consider a process P that wants to create a private name x. In the pi-calculus
this can be done by letting P evolve into a conﬁguration (νx)P , where the channel x is
intendedto remainprivateto P . This privacypolicyis goingto be violatedif the system
then evolves into a situation such as the following, where p is a public channel known
to an hostile process (opponent) running in parallel with P.
p(y).O | (νx)(p x |P ) (2)
In this situation, the name x is about to be sent by P over the public channel p and
received by the opponent. In order for this communication to happen, the rules of the
pi-calculus, described in Section 1, require ﬁrst an enlargement of the scope of x.A f t e r
extrusion we have:
(νx)(p(y).O | p x |P ) (3)
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The private name x has been leaked to the opponentby a combination of two mech-
anisms: the output instruction p x  and the extrusion of (νx). It seems that we need
to restrict either communication or extrusion. Since names are dynamic data in the pi-
calculus,it is not easy to say that a situation such as p x  (sendingx on a channelknown
to the opponent) should not arise, because p may be dynamically obtained from some
other channel, and may not occur at all in the code of P.
The other possibility is to preventextrusion, which is a necessary step when leaking
namesoutsidetheirinitialscope.However,extrusionisafundamentalmechanisminthe
pi-calculus: blocking it completely would also block innocent communications over p.
A natural question is whether one could somehow declare x to be private, and have
thisassertionstaticallycheckedsothattheprivacypolicyofx cannotbeviolated.Tothis
end, in [13] authors add an operation of group creation to the typed pi-calculus, where
a group is a type for channels. Group creation is a natural extension of the sort-based
type systems developed for the pi-calculus (see Section 1). However, group creation
has an interesting and subtle connection with secrecy. Creation of fresh groups has the
effect of statically preventing certain communications, and can block the accidental or
malicious leakage of secrets.
Intuitively, no channel belonging to a fresh group can be received by processes
outside the initial scope of the group, even if those processes are untyped. Crucially,
groups are not values, and cannot be communicated; otherwise, this secrecy property
would fail.
Starting from the typed pi-calculus, we can classify channels into different groups
(usually called sorts). We could have a group G for our private channels and write
(νx:G)P to declare x to be of sort G. However, if groups are global (as usually happens
with sorts in standard pi-calculus type systems), they do not offer any protection be-
cause an opponent could very well mention G in an input instruction, and leakage can
thus be made to typecheck:
p(y : G).O | (νx:G)(p x |P ) (4)
In order to guarantee secrecy, the group G itself should be secret, so that no opponent
can input names of group G, and that no part of the process P can output G information
on public channels.
In general we want the ability to create fresh groups on demand, and then to create
fresh elements of those groups. To this end, we extend the pi-calculus with an operator,
(νG)P, to dynamically create a new group G in a scope P. Although group creation is
dynamic, the group information can be tracked statically to ensure that names of differ-
ent groups are not confused. Moreover, dynamic group creation can be very useful: we
can dynamically spawn subsystems that have their own pool of shared resources that
cannot interfere with other subsystems.
Consider the following process, where G[]is the type of a channel of group G:
(νp:U)(p(y:T).O | (νG)(νx:G[] )p x ) (5)
Here an attempt is made again to send the channel x over the public channel p.F o r -
tunately, this process cannot be typed: the type T would have to mention G,i no r d e r
to receive a channel of group G, but this is impossible because G is not known in the
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The construct (νG) has extrusion properties similar to (νx), which are needed to
permitlegalcommunicationsoverchannelsunrelatedto G channels,butthese extrusion
rules prevent G from being confused with any groups mentioned in T.
Untyped Opponents. Let us now consider the case where the opponent process is un-
typed or, equivalently, not well-typed. This is intended to cover the situation where an
opponent can execute any instruction without being restricted by static checks such as
type checking or bytecode veriﬁcation. For example, the opponent could be running
on a separate, untrusted, machine. Let consider again the previous process, where we
remove typing information from the code of the opponent, since an opponent does not
necessarily respect the typing rules. The opponent now attempts to read any message
transmitted over the public channel, no matter what its type is.
(νp:U)(p(y).O | (νG)(νx:G[] )p x ) (6)
The untyped opponent will not acquire secret information by cheating on the type of
the public channel. The fact that the process P is well typed is sufﬁcient to ensure
secrecy, even in the presence of untyped opponents. This is because, in order for P to
leak informationover a public channel p, the outputoperation p x  must be well typed.
The name x can be communicated only on channels whose type mentions G.S ot h e
output p x  cannot be well typed, because then the typeU of p would have to mention
the group G,b u tU is not in the scope of G.
We have thus established, informally, that a process creating a fresh group G can
never communicate channels of group G to an opponent outside the initial scope of
G, either because a (well typed) opponent cannot name G to receive the message, or,
in any case, because a well typed process cannot use public channels to communicate
G information to an (untyped) opponent. Thus, channels of group G are forever secret
outside the initial scope of (νG). So, secrecy is reduced in a certain sense to scoping
and typing restrictions. As we have seen, the scope of channels can be extruded too far,
perhaps inadvertently, and cause leakage, while the scope of groups offers protection
against accidental or malicious leakage, even though it can be extruded as well.
4.1 Syntax and Operational Semantics
We start showing the syntax of an asynchronous, polyadic, typed pi-calculus with
groups and group creation. Types specify, for each channel, its group and the type of
the values that can be exchanged on that channel.
Types T ::= G[T1,...,Tn] polyadic channel in group G
As usual, in a restriction (νx:T)P the name x is bound in P, and in an input x(˜ y :
˜ T).P, the names y1,...,yk are bound in P. In a group creation (νG)P, the group G
is bound with scope P.L e tfn(P) be the set of free names in a process P,a n dl e t
fg(P),fg(T) be the sets of groups free in a process P and a type T, respectively.
The operational semantics of the calculus is similar to that of the typed pi-calculus
described in Section 1. Group creation is handled by the following new rules of struc-
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Table 9 Typed pi-calculus with Groups
Expressions M,N ::= a,...,p name
 x,...,z variable
Processes P,Q,R ::= 0 stop
 u  ˜ M .P polyadic output
 u(˜ x: ˜ T).P polyadic input
 (νG)P group creation
 (νa:T)P restriction
 P | P composition
 !P replication
(Struct GRes GRes) (νG1)(νG2)P ≡ (νG2)(νG1)P
(Struct GRes Res) (νG)(νx:T)P ≡ (νx:T)(νG)P if G / ∈ fg(T)
(Struct GRes Par) (νG)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νG)P if G / ∈ fg(P)
(Red GRes) (νG)P −→ (νG)Q if P −→ Q
Note that rule (Struct Gres Res) is crucial: it implements a sort of “barrier” between
processes knowing a group name and processes that do not know it.
4.2 The Type System
Environments declare names and groups in scope during type-checking; we deﬁne en-
vironments, Γ,b yΓ ::= / 0 | Γ,G | Γ,x:T. We deﬁne four typing judgments: ﬁrst,   Γ
means that Γ is well formed; second Γ   T means that T is well formed in Γ;t h i r d ,
Γ   x : T means that x : T is in Γ,a n dt h a tΓ is well formed; and, fourth, Γ   P means
that P is well formed in the environment Γ. Typing rules are collected in Table 10.
Properties of the Type System. A consequence of our typing discipline is the ability to
preserve secrets. In particular, the subject reduction property, together with the proper
application of extrusion rules, has the effect of preventing certain communications that
would leak secrets. For example, consider the process (4) at the beginning of this sec-
tion:
(νp:U)(p(y:T).O | (νG)(νx:G[] )p x )
In order to communicate the name x (the secret) on the public channel p, we would
need to reduce the initial process to the following conﬁguration:
(νp:U)(νG)(νx:G[] ) (p(y:T).O | p x )
If subject reduction holds then this reduced term has to be well-typed, which is true
only if p : H[T] for some H,a n dT = G[] . However, in order to get to the point of110 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 10 Typing rules for the pi-calculus with groups
(ENV EMPTY)
  / 0
(ENV u)
Γ   Tu / ∈ dom(Γ)
  Γ,u : T
(ENV GROUP)
  Γ G / ∈ dom(Γ)
  Γ,G
(TYPE CHAN)
G ∈ dom(Γ) Γ   T1...Γ   Tn
Γ   G[T1,...,Tn]
(PROJECT)
  Γ ,x : T,Γ  
Γ ,x : T,Γ     x : T
(GRES)
Γ,G   P
Γ   (νG)P
(INPUT)
Γ   M : G[T1,...,Tn] Γ,x1 : T1,...,xn : Tn   P
Γ   M(x1 : T1,...,xn : Tn)P
(RES)
Γ,n : T   P
Γ   (νn : T)P
(DEAD)
  Γ
Γ   0
(OUTPUT)
Γ   M : G[T1,...,Tn] Γ   N1 : T1...Γ   Nn : Tn
Γ   M N1,...,Nn 
(PAR)
Γ   P Γ   Q
Γ   P | Q
(REPL)
Γ   P
Γ  !P
bringing the input operation of the opponentnext to the output operation,we must have
extrudedthe(νG)andthe(νx:G[])bindersoutward.Therule(StructGresRes),usedto
extrude (νG) past p(y:T).O, requires that G / ∈ fg(T). This contradicts the requirement
that T = G[] .
Proposition 1 (Subject Congruence). If Γ   P and P ≡ Q, then Γ   Q.
Proposition 2 (Subject Reduction). If Γ   P and P −→ Q, then Γ   Q.
The formalization of secrecy is inspired by Abadi’s deﬁnition [2]: a name is kept secret
from an opponent if after no series of interactions is the name transmitted to the oppo-
nent. We model the external opponent simply by the ﬁnite set of names S known to it.
A complete formalization of this notion of security can be found in [13], here we only
overview the main theorem and its proof. The following theorem expresses the idea
that in the process (νG)(νx:G[T1,...,Tn])P, the name x of the new group G is known
only within P (the scope of G) and hence is kept secret from any opponentable to com-
municate with the process (whether or not the opponent respects our type system). Let
erase(P) be the process obtained from P by erasing type annotations and new-group
creations. Let S be a set of names, we say that a process P preserves the secrecy of x
from S if P will never communicate the name x to an opponent initially knowing the
names in S.
Theorem 7 (Secrecy). Suppose that Γ   (νG)(νx:T)Pw h e r eG∈ fg(T).L e tSb et h e
names occurring in dom(Γ). Then the erasure (νx)erase(P) of (νG)(νx:T)P preserves
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The proof of the secrecy theorem (see [13]) is based on an auxiliary type system
that partitions channels into untrusted channels , with type Un and trusted ones, with
typeCh[T1,...,Tn], where each Ti is either a trusted or untrusted type. The type system
insists that names are bound to variables with the same trust level (that is, the same
type), and that no trusted name is ever transmitted on an untrusted channel. Hence an
opponent knowing only untrusted channel names will never receive any trusted name.
In particular, for any group G, we can translate group-basedtypes into the auxiliary
type system as follows: any type that does not contain G free becomesUn, while a type
H[T1,...,Tn] that contains G free is mapped ontoCh[   T1   G,...,   Tn   G]. This transla-
tion is provedto preservetypability.This implies that an opponentknowingonly names
whose type does not contain G free, will never be able to learn any name whose type
contains G free. This is the key step in proving the secrecy theorem.
Finally, note that the typing rules constrain only the principals that want to protect
their secrets from attackers. On the contrary, there are no restrictions on the code the
attackers may run; we have in fact that any untrusted opponent may be type-checked as
follows.
Lemma 1. For all P, if fn(P)={x1,...,xn} then x1 :Un,...,xn :Un  P.
Thisis a distinctivepropertyof the approachwe discussed in thissection,since it makes
the type system suitable for reasoning about processes containing both trusted and un-
trusted subprocesses.
5 The Security Pi Calculus
The security π-calculusis an extension of the π calculusdeﬁned by Hennessy and Riely
[33] to study propertiesof resource access and information ﬂow controlin systems with
multilevel security. Before discussing the security π-calculus, we ﬁrst give a very brief
overview of the underlying models of multilevel security.
5.1 Multilevel Security
Traditionalmodels of security are centered aroundnotionsof subjects and objects, with
the former performing accesses on the latter by read and write (as well as append,
execute, ..., etc. in certain models) operations.Multilevel security presupposesa lattice
of security levels, and every subject and object in the system is assigned a level in
this lattice. Based on these levels, access to objects by subjects are classiﬁed as read-up
(resp.read-down)whenasubjectattemptstoreadanobjectofhigher(resp.lower)level,
and similarly for write accesses. Relying on this classiﬁcation, security policies are
deﬁned to control access to objects by subjects and, more generally ﬂow of information
among the subjects and objects of the system.
An important class of security policies are the so-called Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) policies, among which notable examples are defense security and business se-
curity. Defense security aims at protecting conﬁdentiality of data by preventing ﬂow of
information from high, privileged, subjects to low, users. This is accomplished by for-
bidding read-up’s and write-down’s to objects: low-level users may not read conﬁden-
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Table 11 Syntax: The Security pi calculus
Expressions M,N ::= ... as in Table 1
Processes P,Q,R ::= 0 stop
 u N  asynchronous output
 u(˜ x : ˜ T).P input
 (νa : T)P restriction
 P | P composition
 !P replication
 [P]σ process at clearance σ
information on low-level objects that may be available to low-level users. Business se-
curity, on the other hand, centers around integrity, and a weaker form of conﬁdentiality,
and provides guarantees that low-level users have no direct access to secret high-level
data, either in read or write mode.
Enforcing conﬁdentiality and integrity often requires further constraints to prevent
ﬂow of sensitive information to non-authorizedsubjects arising from subtle and hidden
ways of transmitting information, viz. covert channels: these may be established in
severalways, via system-wideside effectson sharedsystem resources.The prototypical
example of covert channel is realized by means of the “ﬁle system full” exception.
Suppose that a process ﬁlls the ﬁle system, and then deletes a 1-bit ﬁle: further attempts
by that process to write that ﬁle will inform it of any two (high-level) users exchanging
1-bit information via the ﬁle system.
5.2 Syntax of the Security Pi-Calculus
The security π-calculus is based on the asynchronous variant of the π calculus. The
choice of asynchronousoutput is motivated by security reasons, as synchronous output
is more prone to covert channels and implicit ﬂow of information.We will return to this
point later: as of now, we proceed with our discussion on the asynchronous π-calculus
and its extension with security.
There are different ways that the asynchronous π-calculus can be deﬁned: for in-
stance, one may deﬁne it by relyingon the same syntax given in Table 1, and by extend-
ing the relation of structural congruence with the new rule: a M .P ≡ a M .0 | P.T h i s
rule effectively leads to an asynchronous version of the output operation, as it allows
the processP to reduce,henceevolve,independentlyofthe presenceof an inputprocess
consuming the value M sent over the channel a.
Here, however, we will adhere to the more standard practice and use a different
syntax in which output on a channel is deﬁned as a process rather than a preﬁx. The
syntax of the security π-calculus results from the syntax of the π-calculus from this
change and from introducing a new construct for processes.
As anticipated, the output construct is now a process rather than a preﬁx: this is all that
is needed to account for asynchrony. The new syntactic form [P]σ denotes a process
P running at security level σ; it has no real computational meaning, as the notion of
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the instrumented semantics that we will introduce to capture a notion of run-time error
resulting from security violations.
In the instrumented semantics, we view processes as playing the rˆ ole of subjects,
while channels are naturally associated with the rˆ ole of objects that processes access
in read and write mode. Security levels are associated with channels by enriching the
structureofchanneltypes:besidesassociatinginput-outputcapabilitieswitheachname,
channel types also include a security level.
The structure of the types is deﬁned in terms of a lattice SLof security levels. We let
Greek letters like δ,σ,ρ,... range over the elements of this lattice: the top and bottom
elements are denoted by   and ⊥ as usual. To enhance ﬂexibility, the structure of types
allows different security levels to be associated with the input and output capabilities
for a channel. Thus, if S and T are types, channels types may be structured as shown in
the following to examples:
– {w⊥(S),r (T)}:thetypeofchannelswherelow processescanwrite(valuesoftype
S), and only high processes can read (values of type T). This typing is appropriate
for a mailbox, where everybody should be allowed to write but only the owner
should be granted permission to read.
– {w (S),r⊥(S)}: the type of channels where anybody can read, but only high pro-
cesses can write. This typing is typical of an informationchannel, where privileged
users write information for everyone to read.
We give a formal deﬁnition of types in Section 5.5. Before that, we deﬁne the opera-
tional semantics and formalize a notion of security error
5.3 Reduction Semantics
The operationalsemanticsisgiven,as forthe π-calculus,in termsof the two relations of
structural congruence and reduction. Structural congruence is deﬁned by the following
extension of the corresponding relation for the π-calculus:
Table 12 Structural congruence
π-Calculus Rules for Structural Equivalence.
1. P | Q ≡ Q | P, P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R, P | 0 ≡ P
2. (νa)0 ≡ 0, (νa)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(νa)P
3. (νa)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νa)Q if a  ∈ fn(P)
4. !P ≡!P | P
Security π-Calculus Speciﬁc Rules.
5. [P | Q]σ ≡ [P]σ | [Q]σ
6. [(νx : T)P]σ ≡ (νx : T)[P]σ
7. [[P]ρ]σ ≡ [P]σ ρ114 Michele Bugliesi et al.
In addition,as forthe π-calculus,the deﬁnitionincludesthe structuralrules that make≡
a congruence.The rules5 and 6 are notsurprising.In rule 7, the notation ρ σ indicates
the greatest lower bound between ρ and σ in the lattice of security levels. Based on this
relation, the reduction relation is deﬁned as follows:
Table 13 Reduction Relation
(COMM) a  ˜ M |a(˜ x : ˜ T)P −→ P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}
(COMMρ) [a  ˜ M ]σ | [a(˜ x : ˜ T).P]ρ −→ [P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}]ρ
(STRUCT)
P −→ P 
P | Q −→ P  | Q
P −→ P 
[P]σ −→ [P ]σ
P −→ P 
(νa : T)P −→ (νa : T)P 
P ≡ P  P  −→ QQ   ≡ Q
P −→ Q
The rule (COMM) is the asynchronousvariantof the reduction rule for communications
from the π-calculus. The rule (COMMρ) is the corresponding rule for processes with a
clearance: as we noted, the presence of the security level does not affect the computa-
tional behavior of processes. On the other hand, it is the basis for the formalization of
run-time security error.
5.4 Security as Resource Access Control
Security violations occur against a given security policy, which is formalized in the
calculus in terms of (i) a mapping from resources (i.e. names and values) to their types,
and of (ii) an auxiliary reduction relation that underlines the import of the policy by
deﬁning what it means to violate it. As a ﬁrst example, given a mapping Γ, one may
enforce a policy for resource access control by stating that processes at clearance σ
should only have access to channels and values at security level up to (and including)
σ. This can be formalized by the following additional reductions:
Table 14 Security Violation
(E-INPUT) [n(˜ x : ˜ T).P]ρ
Γ −→ err if rσ( ˜ T) ∈ Γ(n)= ⇒ σ    ρ
(E-OUTPUT) [n M ]ρ
Γ −→ err if wσ(T) ∈ Γ(n)= ⇒ σ    ρ
(E-OUTVAL) [n M ]ρ
Γ −→ err if M : Bσ and σ    ρ
(E-STRUCT)
P
Γ −→ err
P | Q
Γ −→ err
P
Γ −→ err
[P]σ
Γ −→ err
P
Γ −→ err
(νa : A)P
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Therule(E-INPUT)statesthata processwith clearanceρcannotreadfromchannels
that are not qualiﬁed by the security policy Γ, or that have security level higher than ρ.
T h er u l e( E-OUTPUT) deﬁnes dual conditions for errors resulting from an attempt to
write on restricted channels. The rule (E-OUTVAL) states that a process with clearance
ρ may only communicate a value along a channel if that value is not restricted from
σ-level processes. In all three cases, the security violation is signalled by a reduction
to the distinguished process term err. The remaining rules are purely structural, and
propagate errors from a process to its enclosing terms.
We give two examples that illustrate the import of different security policies on the
reduction semantics.
Example 3 (Resource Access Violations). Consider the process
P  [c a ]  | [c(x).x 1 ]⊥.
consisting of a high-level and a low-level processes communicating over a channel c,
for which we deﬁne the security policy Γ as follows: Γ(a)=A, Γ(c)=C. First, assume
that the two types A andC are deﬁned as follows:
A = {w (int),r⊥(int)} and C = {w⊥(A),r⊥(A)}
By one reduction step, P reduces to the process [a 1 ]⊥, and the latter reduces to err as
a result of a low-level process attempting to write on the high-level channel a. While
the violation shows up after one reduction step, it originates earlier, from the fact that
the value a of “high” level typeA is written to channel c:C with “low” write capability.
Upgrading the write capability onC does not.
Consider then deﬁning the types A and C differently, giving C high-level write ca-
pability:
A = {w (int),r⊥(int)} and C = {w (A),r⊥(A)}
Again, the reduction of P to [a 1 ]⊥ causes a security violation (i.e. a reduction to err)
because the low-level process [a 1 ]⊥ does not have the right to write on the channel
a for which the write capability is “high”. Here the problem originates from the high
value a being written to a channel c :C with “low” read capability.
The examples give a ﬂavor of the inherent complexity of statically enforcing a security
policy. Most of this complexity is determined by “indirect” ﬂow of information arising
as a result ofprocessesdynamicallyacquiringnewcapabilities. Inour case, theintuitive
and directmeasuresrepresentedby the “no read-up,no write-up”sloganare not enough
to guarantee the desired effects of the access control policy. Further constraints must be
imposedto preventunauthorizedaccess: the purposeof the type system we discuss next
is to provide provably sufﬁcient conditions for absence of security violations during
reduction.
5.5 Types and Subtypes
The formal deﬁnition of types is somewhat complex, as it includes well-formedness
rules ensuring that types are formed according to certain consistency conditions that
provide the desired security guarantees. We start deﬁning sets of pre-capabilities and
pre-types.116 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Pre-Capabilities
cap ::= rσ(T) σ-level input channel carrying values of type T
 wσ(T) σ-level output channel carrying values of type T
Pre-Types
S,T ::= Bσ base type of level σ
 {cap1,...,capk} channel type, k  0
 (T1,...,Tk) tuple type, k  0
Next, we introduce the consistency conditions that single out the legal set of types.
The consistency conditions are formulated in terms of ordering relations over pre-
capabilities and pre-types induced by the ordering on security levels. Both the subtype
relationsare denotedbythe symbol, andare the least reﬂexiveand transitiverelations
that are closed under the rules below.
Table 15 Subtyping
(SUB OUTPUT)
T  S σ   ρ
wσ(S)  wρ(T)
(SUB INPUT)
S  T σ   ρ
rσ(S)  rρ(T)
(SUB BASE)
σ   ρ
Bσ  Bρ
(SUB TYPE)
(∀j ∈ J)(∃i ∈ I)capi  cap 
j
{capi}i∈I  {cap 
j}j∈J
(SUB TUPLE)
Si  Ti i ∈ [1..k]
(S1,...,Sk)  (T1,...,Tk)
The two relations are mutually recursive, following the mutually inductive deﬁnition
of pre-types and pre-capabilities. The rules (SUB INPUT)a n d( S UB OUTPUT)a r et h e
direct generalization of the corresponding rules in Table 4. The remaining rules deﬁne
the subtype relation over basic, channel and tuple pre-types, respectively. Note that the
resulting subtype relation on pre-types generalizes the subtype relation by Pierce and
Sangiorgi we discussed in Section 2.
Now the set of types (as opposed to the previously introduced pre-types) is deﬁned
by a kinding system that identiﬁes the legal pre-types at each security level. Formally,
for each level ρ,t h es e tTypeρ is the least set closed under the following rules:
Table 16 Type Formation
(T-BASE)
σ   ρ
Bσ ∈ Typeρ
(T-TUPLE)
Ti ∈ Typeρ
(T1,...,Tk) ∈ Typeρ
(T-RD)
T ∈ Typeσ σ   ρ
{rσ(T)}∈Typeρ
(T-WR)
T ∈ Typeσ σ   ρ
{wσ(T)}∈Typeρ
(T-WRRD)
S ∈ Typeσ T ∈ Typeσ  σ,σ    ρ S  T
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There are a numberof interesting consequencesof the deﬁnitionthat are worth pointing
out. First note that if σ   ρ then RTypeσ ⊆ RTypeρ. This follows by a straightforward
inductive reasoning on the generation of types at each kind. The second thing to note is
the compatibility requirements between the read and write capabilities in the assump-
tions of the rule (T-WRRD). The condition σ,σ    ρ contributes to the property that
RTypeσ ⊆ RTypeρ for every σ   ρ. The assumption S  T, in turn, is a standard con-
dition required for soundness of channel communication: any value that is written on a
channel can be read from that channel at a super-type of the value’s true type. Interest-
ingly, however, the combination of this condition with the security constraints imposed
by the (T-WRRD) and the other rules has also security implications.
To see them, we ﬁrst state the followingproposition,which can be provedby induc-
tion on the derivation of S ∈ Typeσ.
Proposition 3. If S ∈ Typeσ, and S  T, then there exists ρ with T ∈ Typeρ and σ   ρ.
We illustrate the security implication we just mentioned with and example. Consider
the type T = {w (S),r⊥(S )}, and a channel a : T. A priory, high-level processes (with
clearance  ) may write to this channel, while low-level processes, (with clearance ⊥)
may read from it. But then, it would seem, the channel may be used to leak sensitive
information, for low-level processes may read values written by high-level processes.
In particular, a high-level process could write on a the name of a high-level channel:
low processes could then read that name and gain access to the channel, thus resulting
in a violation of the security policy induced by our instrumented semantics.
A closer look at the type formation and subtyping rules shows that this cannot hap-
pen. To see why, assume that the type T is legal, that is T ∈ Typeρ for some security
level ρ. The hypotheses of the (T-WRRD) rule imply that   ρ, hence ρ =  ;f u r t h e r -
more, the two types S and S  must be such that S ∈ Typeσ with σ    ,a n dS  ∈ Typeσ 
with σ   ⊥and S S . From these conditions, by the aboveproposition,it followsthat
σ   σ , and this, together with σ   ⊥ , implies that σ = ⊥. In other words, the forma-
tion rules require that S ∈ Type⊥, which implies that only low values (and channels)
can be written to any channel of type T. But then, even though high-levelprocesses can
write on channels of type T, they may only write low-level values: thus only low-level
information may ﬂow from high to low processes.
In their present form, the type formation rules limit types to contain at most one
read and one write capabilities: this clearly results in a loss of expressive power, but
there is no fundamental difﬁculty in extending the formalization to handle types in the
general form.
5.6 Typing Rules
The typing rules, given in Table 17, derive judgments in two forms: the usual form
Γ   M : T stating that term M has type T, and the form Γ  σ P which says that process
P is well-typed in the context Γ, at security level σ (the rules for parallel composition
and replication are standard, and omitted).118 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 17 Typing Rules for the Security π-calculus
(NAME)
Γ(u)  A
Γ   u : A
(RESTR)
Γ,a : T  σ PT ∈ Typeσ a  ∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ  σ (νa : T)P
(PROC)
Γ  σ ρ P
Γ  σ [P]ρ
(INPUT)
Γ, ˜ x : ˜ T  σ P Γ   u : rσ( ˜ T) ˜ x∩Dom(Γ)=∅
Γ  σ u(˜ x : ˜ T).P
(OUTPUT)
Γ   u : wσ(T) Γ   M : T
Γ  σ u M 
The ﬁrst three rules should be self-explanatory, but note, in the (RESTR) rule, that only
names at level (at most) σ may legally be introduced by well-typed processes running
at clearance σ.I nt h e( I NPUT) rule, the premises guarantee that the channel is used
consistently with its associated capabilities and security level. For the latter, note that
u offers a read capability at the same level σ at which the input process is currently
running.Fromthedeﬁnitionofsubtyping,andtherule(NAME),itfollowsthatΓ(u)=T
for a type T that includes a read capability at level ρ   σ: this guarantees that a process
with clearance σ may read from any channel with security level up-to σ, as desired.
The same reasoningappliesto the (OUPUT) rule. The constraintsimposed bythe typing
rules, together with the constraints imposed on the type formation rules provide static
guarantees of type safety, that is absence of run-time violations for every well-typed
process. Type safety is formalized as follows.
Theorem 8 (Type Safety for Resource Access). Γ  σ P implies [P]σ  
Γ −→ err
In other words, if a process P is well-typed at clearance σ, then neither P nor any of its
derivatives will attempt a non-authorized access to a value or a channel restricted from
level σ.T h a tP is free of error reductions follows directly from the above theorem:
that it is also true of the derivatives of P follows by the fact that well-typedness at any
clearance level is preserved by reduction as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (Subject Reduction). If Γ  σ P and P −→ Q, then Γ  σ Q
To exemplify the impact of the type system in enforcing our policy of resource access
control, consider the process
P  (νa : A)(νc :C)[c a ]  | [c(x).x 1 ]⊥.
In Example 3 we discussed two deﬁnitions for the types A and C: in both cases, the
process is ill-typed independentlyof the clearance (  or ⊥) at which we may type it. In
fact, ill-typedness is a consequence of the type C being ill-formed, as A ∈ Type  may
not be read from channels of typeC with ⊥-level read capability.
We give more examples illustrating the rˆ ole of types for security in the next section,
where we discuss a variation of the type system that provides guarantees for the “no
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5.7 MAC Policies: Defense Security
Few changes are required to type formationrules to account for this case of MAC secu-
rity: the typing rules, instead, are unchanged. To understand and motivate the changes,
we start with a simple examples.
Example 4 (Defense Security). Consider again the process P from example 3:
P  [c l ]  | [c(x).x 1 ]⊥.
where Γ(c)=C and Γ(l)=L, and the two typesC and L are deﬁned as follows.
C = {w⊥(L),r⊥(L)} and L = {w⊥(int),r⊥(int)}.
With the current type system, P is well typed in Γ, as the channel c has “low” type and
offers read and write capabilities: hence both processes may legally access c.T h es a m e
is true of the type assignment l : L,a n dc : C with L as above, and C deﬁned now as
C = {w (L),r⊥(L)}. Indeed, it is not difﬁcult to see that there is no violation of our
resource access policy, as there is no P error reduction for P or any of its derivatives.
In both the above cases, the term P would be rejected as “unsafe” under defense se-
curity, as in both cases a high-level process ends-up writing a low-level object, hence
establishinga high-to-lowﬂowofinformation.Itis, however,easy toidentifythesource
of the problems, and change the type system to enforce the new constraints.
In the ﬁrst case, the problem is a direct violation of the “no write-down” constraint,
which results from the current deﬁnitionof subtyping.The judgmentΓ   c l  is deriv-
able by an application of the (OUTPUT) from the premise Γ   c : w (L),a sΓ(c) 
w (L). In particular, the subtype relation holds because so does w⊥(L)  w (L):t o
prevent the write-down, it is thus enough to rule out the latter relation.
In the second case, instead, the problem results from the channel c offering a write
capability to processes running at high clearance, and read capability to low processes.
As a result, a low process can “read up” information written by high-level processes on
the same channel. To prevent such situations, it is enough to reﬁne the type formation
rules by requiring that a read capability on a channel type not be lower than the write
capability (if any).
The new set of types may thus be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Types for defense security). For any security level ρ,l e tT y p e ρ be the
least set of types that is closed under the subtype and kind rules of Section 5.5, where
– rule (SUB OUTPUT) is replaced by:
T  S
wσ(S)  wσ(T)
– rule (T-WRRD) is replaced by:
S ∈ Typeσ T ∈ Typeσ  σ   σ    ρ S  T
{wσ(S),rσ (T)}∈Typeρ
Giventhe new deﬁnitionof types,and the typingrules of Table 17,it is possible to show
that well-typed processes do not cause any defense security violation. Of course, this
requires a new deﬁnition of error reductions, to reﬂect the desired notion of violation
under defense security.120 Michele Bugliesi et al.
5.8 Information Flow Security
Having outlined a solution to defense security, we conclude our discussion on the secu-
rity π-calculus with a few observations on information-ﬂow security.
As we already mentioned, information ﬂow security aims at protecting conﬁden-
tiality and integrity of information by preventing ‘implicit’ ﬂow of information via
covert channels. Examples of covert channels may naturally formalized in the security
π-calculus.
As a ﬁrst example, consider the system:
[h(x).if x = 0 then hl 0  else hl 1 ]  | [hl(z).Q]⊥
where one has hl : HL and h : H, and the two types in question are deﬁned as follows:
HL = {w (int),r⊥(int)}, H = {w (int),r (int)}.
We have already noticed the presence of information ﬂow in a similar process in Ex-
ample 4, resulting from a low process reading on a channel that is written by a high
process. Here the case of information ﬂow is more interesting, however,as the low pro-
cess gains additional information on the value x transmitted over the high-channel h.
Indeed, the example is not problematic, as the deﬁnition of types for defense security
rules out this system as insecure. Consider however, the new system:
[h(x)if x = 0 then [l 0 ]⊥ else [l 1 ]⊥]  | [l(z).Q]⊥
where now h : H, l : L and the two types are deﬁned as follows:
H = {w (int),r (int)}, L = {w⊥(int),r⊥(int)}
This system is well-typed, even with the type system of Section 5.7, as the high-level
process downgrades itself prior to writing on the low-level channel l. Still, the system
exhibits the same high-to-low ﬂow of information as before.
As a ﬁnal example, it is instructive to look at the impact of synchronous communi-
cation over informationﬂow. Assuming synchronouscommunicationthe following has
the same problems as the previous one. Consider
[l1  .Q1 | l2  .Q2]⊥ | [if x = 0 then l1() else l2()] 
Assuming L = {w⊥(),r⊥()},a n dl1,l2 : L, the system is well-typed, and yet there is an
implicit ﬂow of information arising purely from synchronization: information on the
value of x may be assumed by both the continuations Q1 and Q2 of the low process.
5.9 Further Reading
The work on information-ﬂow security for the π-calculus is well developed in [34]
and subsequent work by Hennessy2. A related approach is discussed by Honda and
Vasconcelos in [35].
2 (see http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/matthewh/research.html).A Survey of Name-Passing Calculi and Crypto-Primitives 121
Information ﬂow analysis based on non-interference originated with the seminal
idea of Goguen and Meseguer [32]. In process calculi, the ﬁrst formalizations of non-
interference were proposed in [51,24,52], based on suitable trace-based notions of be-
havioral process equivalence for CCS-like calculi.
Informationﬂow analyses based on typing techniqueswere ﬁrst discussed in the pi-
oneering work D. and P. Dennings [19], in which a type system detecting direct and in-
direct ﬂows among program variables in imperative languages was devised. This initial
idea was reﬁned and formalized some twenty years later in work on type systems pro-
viding guarantees of non-interference in multi-threaded programming languages both
in nondeterministic [56,55] and probabilistic settings [53].
Type systems for secure information ﬂow and non-interferencein process have also
been applied to enforce secrecy of cryptographic protocols. The most notable applica-
tions of typing techniques for analysis of security protocols have been developed for
Abadi and Gordon’s spi calculus [5,10], that we discuss in the next section.
6 The CryptoSPA Calculus
In this section we report from [27] the Cryptographic Security Process Algebra (Cryp-
toSPA forshort).Itisbasicallyavariantofvalue-passingCCS [41],wheretheprocesses
are provided with some primitives for manipulating messages. In particular, processes
can perform message encryption and decryption, and also construct complex messages
by composing together simpler ones.
6.1 Syntax of the Calculus
CryptoSPA syntax is based on the following elements:
– As e tI = {a,b,...} of input channels, a set O = {¯ a,¯ b,...} of output ones;
– As e tM of basic messages and a set K of encryptionkeys with a function·−1 : K →
K such that (k−1)−1 = k.T h es e tM of all messages is deﬁned as the least set such
that M∪K ∈ M and ∀m ∈ M , ∀k ∈ K we have that (m,m ) and {m}k also belong
to M ;
– As e tC of public channels; these channels represent the insecure network where
the enemy can intercept and fake messages;
– A family U of sets of messages and a function Msg(c) : I ∪O −→ U which maps
everychannelc intotheset ofpossiblemessagesthatcanbesent andreceivedalong
such a channel. Msg is such that Msg(c)=Msg(¯ c).
– As e tAct = {c(m) | c ∈ I,m ∈ Msg(c)}∪{c m |c ∈ O,m ∈ Msg(c)}∪{τ} of
actions(τis the internal,invisibleaction),rangedoverby a; we also havea function
chan(a) which returns c if a is either c(m) or c m , and the special channel void
when a = τ; we assume that void is never used within a restriction operator (see
below).
– As e tConst of constants, ranged over by A.
The syntax of CryptoSPA agents is deﬁned as follows:
E ::= 0 c(x).E c e .E τ.E E +E E E E \L E[f]
A(m1,...,mn) [e = e ]E;E [ e1...er   rule x]E;E122 Michele Bugliesi et al.
where x is a variable, m1,...,mn are messages, e,e1,...,er are messages (possibly
containing variables) and L is a set of input channels. Both the operators c(x).E and
[ e1...er   rule x]E;E  bind the variable x in E. It is also necessary to deﬁne constants
as follows: A(x1,...,xn)  E where E is a CryptoSPA agent which may contain no free
variables except x1,...,xn, which must be distinct.
Besides the standard value-passing CCS operators, we have an additional one that
has been introduced in order to model message handling and cryptography.Informally,
the [ m1...mr   rule x]E1;E2 process tries to deduce an information z from the tuple of
messages  m1...mr  throughone applicationof rule rule; if it succeedsthen it behaves
like E1[z/x], otherwise it behaves like E2; for example, given a rule  dec for decryption,
process[ {m}k,k−1   decx]E1;E2 decryptsmessage{m}k throughkeyk−1 andbehaves
like E1[m/x] while [ {m}k,k    dec x]E1;E2 (with k   = k−1) tries to decrypt the same
message with the wrong inverse key k  and (since it is not permitted by  dec) it behaves
like E2.
We call E the set of all the CryptoSPA terms, and we deﬁne sort(E) to be the set of
all the channels syntactically occurring in the term E.
6.2 The Operational Semantics of CryptoSPA
In order to model message handling and cryptography, in Table 18 we deﬁne an infer-
ence system which formalizes the way messages may be manipulated by processes.
Table 18 Inference System for message manipulation
Let m,m  ∈ M and k,k−1 ∈ K.
m&m ’
(m,m’)
( pair)
(m,m’)
m
( fst)
(m,m’)
m’
( snd)
m&k
{m}k
( enc)
{m}k & k−1
m
( dec)
It is indeed quite similar to those used by many authors (see, e.g., [38,39]). In par-
ticular it can combinetwo messages obtaininga pair (rule pair); it can extract one mes-
sage froma pair (rules fst and  snd); it can encrypta message m with a key k obtaining
{m}k and ﬁnally decrypt a message of the form {m}k only if it has the corresponding
(inverse) key k−1 (rules  enc and  dec). We denote with D(φ) the set of messages that
can be deduced by applying the inference rules on the messages in φ. Note that we are
assuming encryption as completely reliable. Indeed we do not allow any kind of cryp-
tographic attack, e.g., the guessing of secret keys. This permits to observe the attacks
that can be carried out even if cryptographyis completely reliable.
The formal behavior of a CryptoSPA term is described by means of the labelled
transition system < E,Act,{
a −→} a∈A >,w h e r e
a −→ a∈A is the least relation between
CryptoSPA terms induced by axioms and inference rules of Table 19.A Survey of Name-Passing Calculi and Crypto-Primitives 123
Table 19 Operational semantics
(input) m ∈ Msg(c)
c(x).E
c(m)
−→ E[m/x]
(output) m ∈ Msg(c)
c m .E
c m 
−→ E
(internal)
τ.E
τ −→ E
( 1) E
a −→ E 
E E1
a −→ E  E1
( 2)E
c(m)
−→ E  E1
c m 
−→ E 
1
E E1
τ −→ E  E 
1
(+1) E
a −→ E 
E +E1
a −→ E  ([f]) E
a −→ E 
E[f]
f(a)
−→ E [f]
(\L)E
a −→ E  chan(a)  ∈ L
E\L
a −→ E \L
(=1) m  = m  E2
a −→ E 
2
[m = m ]E1;E2
a −→ E 
2
(=2) m = m  E1
a −→ E 
1
[m = m ]E1;E2
a −→ E 
1
(def)E[m1/x1,...,mn/xn]
a −→ E  A(x1,...,xn)  E
A(m1,...,mn)
a −→ E 
(D1) m1...mr   rule mE 1[m/x]
a −→ E 
1
[ m1...mr   rule x]E1;E2
a −→ E 
1
(D2)  ∃m :  m1...mr   rule mE 2
a −→ E 
2
[ m1...mr   rule x]E1;E2
a −→ E 
2
Plus symmetric rules for +1,  1 and  2are omitted
Example. We present a very simple example of a protocol where A sends a message
mA to B encrypted with a key kAB shared between A and B3. We deﬁne it as P 
A(mA,kAB) B(kAB) where A(m,k)  c {m}k 4 and B(k)  c(y).[ y,k   dec z]out z .
Moreover, k−1
AB = kAB (symmetric encryption) and Msg(c)={{m}k | m ∈ M,k ∈ K}.
We want to analyze the execution of P with no intrusions, we thus consider P\{c},
since the restriction guarantees that c can be used only inside P. We obtain a system
which can only execute action out mA  that represents the correct transmission of mA
from A to B. In particular, the only possible execution is the one where A sends to B
message {mA}kAB and then out mA  is executed:
P\{c}
τ −→ (0   [ {mA}kAB,kAB   dec z]out z )\{c}
out mA 
−→ (0 0)\{c}
The calculus of CryptoSPA has been successfully applied to the automatic speciﬁ-
cation and the veriﬁcation of security protocols, see [20,26,27,21,25,23,48–50,22].
3 For the sake of readability, we omit the termination 0 at the end of every agent speciﬁcations,
e.g., we write a in place of a.0. We also write [m = m ]E in place of [m = m ]E;0 and analo-
gously for [ m1...mr   rule x]E;0.
4 Note that this process could be also written as A(m,k)  [ m,k   enc x]c x .124 Michele Bugliesi et al.
7 The Spi-Calculus
The spi calculus is an extension of the pi calculus with cryptographic primitives that
has been introduced by Abadi and Gordon in [5,10], The spi calculus is designed
for describing and analyzing security protocols, such as those for authentication and
for electronic commerce. These protocols rely on cryptography and on communica-
tion channels with properties like authenticity and privacy. Accordingly, cryptographic
operations and communication through channels, are the main ingredients of the spi
calculus.
As we discussed in Section 1, some abstract security protocol can be expressed in
the pi calculus, thanks to its simple but powerful primitives for channels. Moreover,
the scoping rules of the pi calculus guarantee that the environment of a protocol (the
attacker) cannot access a channel that is not explicitly given; scoping is thus the basis
of security. However, as we pointed out, when considering a distributed environment,it
is not realistic to rely only on the scope rules, we also have to prevent the context from
having free access to public channels over which private names are communicated. In
a distributed environment such a channel protection relies on the use of cryptography.
With shared-key cryptography, secrecy can be achieved by communication on public
channels under secret keys.
The spi calculus is thus an extension of the pi calculus that consider cryptographic
issues in more detail. Its features can be summarized as follows:
– it permits an explicit representation of the use of cryptography in protocols, while
it does not seem easy to represent encryptionand decryptionwithin the pi calculus;
– it relies on the powerful scoping constructs of the pi calculus;
– within the spi calculus, the environment can be deﬁned as an arbitrary spi calculus
process instead of giving an explicit model;
– security properties, both integrity and secrecy, can be represented as equivalences
and analyzed by means of static techniques.
7.1 Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of the spi calculus extends a particular version of the pi calculus with con-
structs for encrypting and decrypting messages (see Table 20) . In standard pi calculus
names are the only terms. For convenience, the syntax of spi calculus also contains
constructs for paring and numbers, namely (M,N),0a n dsucc(M). Furthermore, the
term {M1,...,Mk}N represents the ciphertext obtained by encrypting M1,...,Mk under
the key N using a shared-key cryptosystem such as DES. The key is an arbitrary term;
typically, names are used as keys because in the spi calculus names are unguessable
capabilities.
Intuitively, the new constructs of spi calculus have the following meanings: a match
[Mi sN ]P behaves as P providedthat terms M and N are the same, otherwise it is stuck.
A pair splitting process let (x,y)=Mi nP ,w h e r ex and y are bound in P, behaves as
P{x:=N,y:=L} if the term M is the pair (N,L). An integer case process case M of 0:
Ps u c c (x) : Q,w h e r ex is bound in Q, behaves as P if term M is 0, as Q{x := N} if M
is succ(N). Finally the process case L of {x1,...,xk}N in P,w h e r ex1,...,xk are boundA Survey of Name-Passing Calculi and Crypto-Primitives 125
Table 20 Spi calculus syntax
Expressions L,M,N ::= bv basic value
 a,...,p name
 x,...,z variable
 (M,N) pair
 0 zero
 succ(M) successor
 {M1,...,Mk}N shared-key encryption (k ≥ 0)
Processes P,Q,R ::= 0 stop
 u N1,...,Nk .P output (k ≥ 0)
 u(x1,...,xk).P input (k ≥ 0)
 (νa)P restriction
 P | P composition
 !P replication
 [Mi sN ]P match
 let (x,y)=Mi nP pair splitting
 case M of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q integer case
 case L of {x1,...,xk}N in P shared-key decryption (k ≥ 0)
in P, attempts to decrypt the term L with the key N;i fL is a ciphertext of the form
{M1,...,Mk}N, then the process behaves as P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}, and otherwise
the process is stuck.
Implicit in the deﬁnition of the spi calculus syntax are some standard but signiﬁcant
assumptions about cryptography: (i) the only way to decrypt an encrypted packet is to
know the corresponding key; (ii) an encrypted packet does not reveal the key that was
used to encrypt it; (iii) there is sufﬁcient redundancyin messages so that the decryption
algorithm can detect whether a ciphertext was encrypted with the expected key.
Operational Semantics. The operational semantics of spi calculus can be deﬁned in
terms of a structural congruence and a reduction relation, extending the corresponding
relations deﬁned in Section 1 for the π calculus. In particular, structural congruence is
deﬁned as the least congruence relation closed under rules 1.-4. of Section 1.1 plus the
following rules:
(Red Repl) !P ≡ P | !P
(Red Match) [Mi sM ]P ≡ P
(Red Let) let (x,y)=( M,N) in P ≡ P{x := M,y := N}
(Red Zero) case 0 of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q ≡ P
(Red Succ) case succ(M) of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q ≡ Q{x := M}
(Red Decrypt) case { ˜ M}N of {˜ x}N in P ≡ P{˜ x := ˜ M}
The reduction relation is then the least relation closed under the following rules: In or-
der to develop proof techniques for the spi calculus, we deﬁne an auxiliary, equivalent,
operational semantics based on a commitment relation, in the style of Milner [44]. The126 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 21 Reduction Relation
(COMM) n(x1,...,xk).P | n M1,...,Mk .Q −→ P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}|Q
(STRUCT)
P −→ P 
P | Q −→ P  | Q
P −→ P 
(νn)P −→ (νn)P 
P ≡ P  P  −→ Q  Q  ≡ Q
P −→ Q
deﬁnition of commitment depends on two new syntactic forms: abstractions and con-
cretions. An abstractionis a term of the form (˜ x)P,w h e r ex1,...,xk are boundvariables,
and P is a process. A concretion is a term of the form (ν ˜ m)  ˜ M P where M1,...,Mk are
expressions, P is a process, and the names m1,...ml are bound in M1,...,Mk and P.
Finally an agent is an abstraction, a process or a concretion. We use the metavariables
A and B to stand for arbitrary agents,C for concretions, and F for abstractions.
Restriction and parallel compositionfor abstractions and concretions are deﬁned as fol-
lows:
(νm)(˜ x)P =(˜ x)(νm)P
Q | (˜ x)P =(˜ x)(Q | P) with {˜ x}∩fv(Q)=/ 0
(νm)(ν ˜ n)  ˜ M P =( νm, ˜ n)  ˜ M P with m / ∈{˜ n}
Q | (ν ˜ n)  ˜ M P =( ν ˜ n)  ˜ M Q | P with {˜ n}∩fn(Q)=/ 0
If F is the abstraction (x1,...,xk)P andC is the concretion (νn1,...,nl) M1,...,Mk Q,
and if {n1,...,nl}∩fn(P)=/ 0, we deﬁne the process F@C andC@F as follows:
F@C  (νn1)...(νnl)(P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk}|Q)
C@F  (νn1)...(νnl)(Q | P{x1 := M1,...,xk := Mk})
Let the reduction relation > be the least relation on closed processes that satisﬁes the
following axioms:
(Red Repl) !P > P | !P
(Red Match) [Mi sM ]P > P
(Red Let) let (x,y)=( M,N) in P > P{x := M,y := N}
(Red Zero) case 0 of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q > P
(Red Succ) case succ(M) of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q > Q{x := M}
(Red Decrypt) case { ˜ M}N of {˜ x}N in P > P{˜ x := ˜ M}
A barb β is a name m (representing input) or a co-name m (representing output). An
action is a barb or a distinguished silent action τ. The commitment relation is written
P
α −→ A where P is a closed process, α is an action and A is a closed agent. The
commitment relation is deﬁned by rules in Table 22.
The following proposition asserts that the two operational semantics for spi cal-
culus, the one based on reduction relation, and the other one based on commitment
relation, are equivalent.
Proposition 4. P −→ Q if and only if P
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Table 22 Commitment Relation
(COMM OUT)
m  ˜ M .P
m −→ (ν)  ˜ M P
(COMM IN)
m(˜ x).P
m −→ (˜ x)P
(COMM INTER 1)
P
m −→ FQ
m −→ C
P | Q
τ −→ F@C
(COMM INTER 2)
P
m −→ CQ
m −→ F
P | Q
τ −→ C@F
(COMM PAR 1)
P
α −→ A
P | Q
α −→ A | Q
(COMM PAR 2)
Q
α −→ A
P | Q
α −→ P | A
(COMM RES)
P
α −→ A α / ∈{ m,m}
(νm)P
α −→ (νm)A
(COMM RED)
P > QQ
α −→ A
P
α −→ A
Testing Equivalence. Testing equivalence is useful to compare process behaviors and
to deﬁne security properties such as secrecy and authentication.
Let a test b eap a i r(Q,β) consisting of a closed process Q and a barb β. We say that
P passes at e s t(Q,β) if and only if
(P | Q)
τ −→ Q1...
τ −→ Qn
β
−→ A
for some n ≥ 0, some processes Q1,...,Qn and some agent A. We obtain a testing
preorder   and a testing equivalence   on closed processes:
P   P   for any test (Q,β),i fP passes (Q,β) then P  passes (Q,β)
P   P   P   P  and P    P
The idea of testing equivalence comes from the work of De Nicola and Hennessy [18].
A test neatly formalizes the idea of a generic experiment or observation that another
process (such as an attacker) might perform on a process. Thus testing equivalence
conciselycapturestheconceptofequivalenceinanarbitraryenvironment.Furthermore,
testing equivalenceis a congruence;more precisely,if P Q then P and Q may be used
interchangeably in any context, that is C[P]  C[Q] for any closed contextC.
7.2 Secrecy by Typing in the Spi Calculus
In this section we describe rules that Abadi proposed in [1] for achieving secrecy prop-
erties in security protocols expressed in the spi calculus. The rules have the form of
typing rules; they guarantee that, if a protocol typechecks, then it does not leak its se-
cret inputs. Before starting the formalization of the type system, we recall from [1]
some informal security principle we adopt in the following.
First, our rules should constrain only the principals that want to protecttheir secrets
form the attacker. That is since in some situations we may assume that the attacker
cannot guess certain keys, but we cannot expect to restrict the code that the attacker
runs.128 Michele Bugliesi et al.
We then consider only three classes of data: Public data, which can be communicated
to anyone, Secret data, which should not be leaked, Any data, that is, arbitrary data. We
refer to Secret, Public and Any as levels or types. We then assume that
The result of encrypting data with a public key has the same classiﬁcation as
the data, while the result of encrypting data with a secret key may be made
public.
Only public data can be sent on public channels, while all kinds of data may be
sent on secret channels.
Because a piece of data of level Any could be of level Secret, it should not be leaked.
On the other hand, a piece of data of level Any could be of level Public, so it cannot be
used as a secret. Thus
if all we know about a piece of data is that it has level Any, then we should
protect it as if it had level Secret, but we can exploit it only if it had level
Public.
In our rules we adopt a standard format for all messages on secret channels or under
secret keys. Each message on a secret channel has three components, the ﬁrst of which
has level Secret, the second Any, and the third Public, plus a confounder component.
This schema implements the following principle:
Upon receipt of a message, it should be easy to decide which part of the con-
tents are sensitive information, if any. This decision is least error-prone when
it does not depend on implicit context.
For the use of confounders,note that if each encryptedmessage of a protocol includesa
freshly generated confounderin a standard position, then the protocol will not generate
the same ciphertext more than once.
Types and Typing Rules. The syntax of types corresponds to the three classes of data:
Types S,T ::= Public | Secret | Any
Thereisalsoasubtypingrelationbetweentypes:T <:SholdsifT equalsSorifS isAny.
The typing system contains three forms of judgments:   E stating that the environment
E is well formed, E   M : T stating that the term M is of level T in E,a n dE   P stating
that the process P typechecks in E.
An environment is a list of distinct names and variables with associated levels.
In addition, each name n has an associated term of the form {M1,...,Mk,n}N.T h i s
association means that the name n may be used as a confounder only in the term
{M1,...,Mk,n}N. We write x : T for variable x with level T,a n dn : T :: {M1,...,
Mk,n}N. The rules for environmentsare in Table 23.
The hypotheses of rule (ENV NAME) imply that if a variable x occurs in {M1,...,
Mk,n}N, then it is declared in E. This means that we cannot instantiate the variable x
in several ways, obtaining several different terms with the same confounder, and thus
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Table 23 Environment Formation
(ENV / 0)
  / 0
(ENV VAR)
  Ex / ∈ dom(E)
  E,x : T
(ENV NAME)
  En / ∈ dom(E) E   Mi : Ti i = 1..kE   N : S
  E,n : T :: {M1,...,Mk,n}N
Table 24 Typing Rules for Terms
(SUBSUM)
E   M : TT <: S
E   M : S
(VARIABLE)
  Ex : T ∈ E
E   x : T
(NAME)
  En : T :: {M1,...,Mk,n}N in E
E   n : T
(ZERO)
  E
E   0:Public
(SUCC)
E   M : T
E   succ(M) : T
(PAIR)
E   M : TE   N : T
E   (M,N) : T
(ENCRYPTSecret )
E   M1 : Secret E   M2 : Any E   M3 : Public
E   N : Secret n : T :: {M1,M2,M3,n}N in E
E  { M1,M2,M3,n}N : Public
(ENCRYPTPublic ) with T =Public if k = 0
E   Mi : Ti = 1..kE   N : Public
E  { M1,...,Mk,n}N : T
Rules (ZERO)a n d(S UCC) saythat0isoflevelPublicandthataddingonepreserves
the level of a piece of data. Therefore, these classiﬁcations mean that the typing system
works even against an attacker that may generate any number, starting from 0 and suc-
cessively incrementing it. The rule (ENCRYPT Public )s a y st h a tk pieces of data of the
same level T can be encrypted under a key of level Public, with a resulting ciphertext
of level T.T h er u l e(E NCRYPT Secret ) imposes more restrictions for encryption under
keysoflevelSecret,becausethe resultingciphertextis of level Public.These restrictions
enforce a particular format for the contents and the use of a confounder: the ciphertext
must contain a ﬁrst componentof level Secret, a second one of level Any, a third one of
level Public, and an appropriate confounder as ﬁnal component. Note that there is no
rule for encryption for the case where N is a term of level Any.
Finally, typing rules for processes are collected in Table 25.
The ﬁrst four rules handle input and output processes. Rule (OUTPUT Public )s a y s
that terms of level Public may be sent on a channel of level Public.R u l e( O UTPUT
Secret ) says that terms of all levels may be sent on a channel of level Secret,p r o -
vided this is done according to the correct format of a secret message. The two rules
for input match these rules for output. Note that if M is a term of level Any and it is
not known whether it is of level Public or Secret,t h e nM cannot be used as a channel.
The rule (PAIR SPLIT) breaks a term of level Public or Secret into two components,
each assumed to be of the same level of the original term. The case where the origi-130 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Table 25 Typing rules for processes
(OUTPUTPublic )
E   M : Public E   Mi : Public i = 1..kE   P
E   M M1,...,Mk .P
(DEAD)
  E
E   0
(PAR)
E   PE   Q
E   P | Q
(OUTPUTSecret )
E   M : Secret E   P
E   M1 : Secret E   M2 : Any E   M3 : Public
E   M M1,M2,M3 .P
(REPL)
E   P
E  !P
(NEW)
E,n : T :: L   P
E   (νn)P
(INPUT Secret )
E   M : Secret E,x1 : Secret,x2 : Any,x3 : Public   P
E   M(x1,x2,x3).P
(INPUTPublic )
E   M : Public E,xi : Public   Pi = 1..k
E   M(x1,...,xk).P
(PAIR SPLIT) T ∈{ Public,Secret}
E   M : TE ,x : T,y : T   P
E   let (x,y)=Mi nP
(INTEGER) T ∈{ Public,Secret}
E   M : TE   PE ,x : T   Q
E   case M of 0:Ps u c c (x) : Q
(MATCH) T,S ∈{ Public,Secret}
E   M : TE   N : SE   P
E   [Mi sN ]P
(DECRYPTPublic ) T ∈{ Public,Secret}
E   L : TE   N : Public E,xi : T   Pi = 1..k
E   case L of {x1,...,xk}N in P
(DECRYPTSecret ) T ∈{ Public,Secret}
E   L : TE   N : Secret E,x1 : Secret,x2 : Any,x3 : Public,x4 : Any   P
E   case L of {x1,x2,x3,x4}N in P
nal term is known only to be of level Any is disallowed; if it were allowed, this rule
would permit leaking whether the term is in fact a pair. The same holds true for rules
(MATCH),(INTEGER)a n d( D ECRYPT). Rule (DECRYPT Secret ) gives the level Any
to the confounder in the message being decrypted, for lack of more accurate static in-
formation but with no signiﬁcant loss. Finally, note that there is no rule for decryption
with a key of level Any.
Properties of the Type System. The main property of the previous type system is that if
a process P typechecks, then it does not leak the values of parameters of level Any.
Thesecrecypropertyofwelltypedprocessesisformalizedinthefollowingtheorem,
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Theorem 10 (Secrecy). If only variables of level Any and only names of level Public
areinthedomainoftheenvironmentE,ifσandσ  aretwosubstitutionsofvaluesforthe
variables in E, and if P typechecks, i.e. E   P, then Pσ and Pσ  are testing equivalent,
i.e. Pσ   Pσ .
The conclusion of theorem 10 means that an observer cannot distinguish Pσ and
Pσ , so it cannot detect the difference in the values for the variables. Despite their
secrecy, none of these variables is declared with level Secret ; however, the process
P may produce terms of level Secret during its execution using the restriction opera-
tor (e.g. it may construct fresh encryption keys). For instance, P may be the process
(νK)(νm)(νn)c {m,x,0,n}K  where x is of level Any and c is of level Public,a n d
where we can assign the type Secret to the bound names K,m,n. Theorem 10 implies
that P does not leak the value x, in the sense that P{x := M} and P{x := N} are testing
equivalent for all closed terms M and N. Thus, the typing system is meant to protect
parameters of level Any relying on dynamically generated names of level Secret.
7.3 An Example with Key Establishment
We arguedthat the spi calculus enables more detailed descriptions of security protocols
than the pi calculus. While the pi calculus enables the representation of channels, the
spi calculus also enables the representation of channel implementations in terms of
cryptography.
As in the pi calculus, scoping is the basis of security in spi calculus. In particular,
restriction can be used to model the creation of fresh, unguessable cryptographic keys.
Restriction can also be used to model the creation of fresh nonces of the sort used in
challenge-response exchanges.
In this section we reﬁne the example shown in Section 1, where we presented an
abstract and simpliﬁed version of the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol. The following ex-
ample is the cryptographic version of that of Section 1. In this protocol, the principals
A and B share keys KAS and KSB respectively with a server S.W h e nA and B want to
communicate securely, A creates a new key KAB, sends it to the server under KAS,a n d
the server forwards it to B under KSB. Since all communication is protected by encryp-
tion, communication can take place through public channels, which we write cAS,cSB
and cAB as in Section 1. In addition to the keys and the payload M, the protocol mes-
sages include the names of principals and confounders.Informally,a simpliﬁed version
of this protocol is:
Message 1: A → S {KAB,∗,(A,B),CA}KAS on cAS
Message 2: S → B {KAB,∗,(A,B),CS}KSB on cSB
Message 3: A → B {∗,M,∗,C 
A}KAB on cAB
The channels cAS,cBS,cAB are public. The keys KAS,KSB are secret keys for communi-
cation with the server, while KAB is the new secret key for communication from A to B.
CA,C 
A,CS are confounders, and ∗ is an arbitrary message of appropriate level. In Mes-
sage 1, A provides the key KAB to S, which passes it on to B in Message 2. In Message
1 and Message 2, the pair (A,B) conveys the names of the users of the key. In Message
3, A uses KAB for sending M.132 Michele Bugliesi et al.
In the spi calculus, we can express this message sequence as follows, where we
assume that B, after receiving the message M from A, outputs an arbitrary message on
a public cannel d:
A(M)  (νKAB)(νCA)cAS {KAB,∗,(a,b),CA}KAS .(νC 
A)cAB {∗,M,∗,C 
A}KAB 
S  cAS(x).c a s exof{xkey,x1,x2,xcnf}KAS in (νCS)cSB {xkey,x1,x2,CS}KSB 
B  cBS(x).c a s exof{xkey,x1,x2,ycnf}KSB in
cAB(z).case z of{z1,zcipher,z2,zcfn}xkey in d ∗ }
Inst(M)  (νKAS)(νKSB)(A(M) | S | B)
Now, assuming that M is a term of type Any,a n dcAS,cBS,cAB,d are channels of type
Public, it is easy to prove that the process Inst(M) is well typed. As a consequence of
the theorem 10, we have that the protocolabove does not revealthe message M from A.
In particular, we have Inst(M )   Inst(M  ) for arbitrary terms M ,M  .
Notice that also in this versionof the Wide MouthedFrog protocol,the use of scope
extrusion is essential: A generates the key KAB and sends it out of scope to B via S.
In the example discussed so far, channelestablishmentand data communicationhappen
only once. More sophisticated examples may be written to represent many protocol
sessions between many principals. However, as the intricacy of the examples increases,
so does the opportunity for errors. Note that many of the mistakes in authentication
protocols arise from confusion between sessions. See [6] for further examples.
7.4 Secrecy Types for Asymmetric Communication
Although so far we have discussed only shared-key cryptography, other kinds of cryp-
tography are also easy to treat within the spi calculus. Many security protocols use
asymmetric communicationprimitives, namely communicationchannels with only one
ﬁxed end-point (the receiver) and particularly public-key encryption. Compared to
shared-key encryption, these primitives present special difﬁculties, partly because they
relyonpairsofrelatedcapabilities(e.g.“public”and“private”keys)withdifferentlevel
of secrecy and scopes.
In this section, we show a variant of spi calculus that focus on asymmetric commu-
nication primitives, especially public-key encryption. This process calculus has been
proposedbyAbadiandBlanchetin [3],whereauthorsalso show a type system in which
types convey secrecy properties and such that well typed programs keep their secrets.
We considera polyadic,asynchronous,variantof spicalculusthatincludeschannels
with only one ﬁxed end-point (the receiver) and public-key encryption. Channels with
ﬁxed receivers can be used for transmitting secrets if the adversary cannot listen on
those channels. On the other hand, the capability for sending on those channels may
be published. Such channels may therefore convey not only secrets but also public data
from the adversary. The type system will handle both cases.
In addition, in a public-key encryption scheme, the capabilities of encryption and
decryption are separate, and can be handled separately. Typically, the capability for
decryption (the “private” key) remains with one principal, while the capability for en-
cryption (the “public” key) may be published. Our process calculus and type system
treat public-key encryption and communicationon channels with ﬁxed receivers analo-
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Table 26 Syntax of the process calculus
Expressions L,M,N ::= a,...,p,k name
 x,...,z variable
 {M1,...,Mk}N encryption (k ≥ 0)
Processes P,Q,R ::= 0 stop
 M N1,...,Nk  output (k ≥ 0)
 a(x1,...,xk).P input (k ≥ 0)
 (νa)P restriction
 P | P composition
 !P replication
 case M of {x1,...,xn}k : Pe ls eQ decryption (n ≥ 0)
 if M= N thenP else Q conditional
The syntax of the process calculus is shown in Table 26. In order to deal with asym-
metric communication,Abadi and Blanchet in [3] propose to follow the same approach
of the local pi calculus [40].
In the local pi calculus, input is possible only on channels that are syntactically rep-
resented by names (and not variables). Output is possible on channels represented by
names or variables. Thus, the input capability for a channel a remains within the scope
of the restriction (νa)P where a is created, while the output capability can be trans-
mitted outside. Further, this approach is extended to public-key encryption, as follows.
Decryption is possible only with keys that are syntactically represented by names (and
not variables). Encryption is possible with keys that are represented by names or vari-
ables. Thus we have a model where the encryption capability may be public while the
decryption capability remains private, in the scope where it is generated.
Thus, when a name a refers to a channel, it represents both end-points of the chan-
nels, that is the capabilities for output and input on the channel. A variable can confer
only the former capability, even if its run-time value is a. Similarly, a name k will not
represent a single encryption or decryption key, but rather the pair of an encryption
key and the corresponding decryption key. A variable can confer only the capability of
encrypting, even if its value is k at run-time.
As an example, consider the following process:
(νk)(a k |b(x).case x of {y}k : c y )
This process relies on three public channels, a,b,c. It generates a fresh key pair k; out-
puts the corresponding encryption key on a; and receives messages on b, ﬁltering for
one encrypted under k, of which it outputs the plaintext on c.
The operational semantics of the calculus can be deﬁned in a standard way using a
reduction relation and a structural congruence relation, see [3] for details.134 Michele Bugliesi et al.
Secrecy by Typing. In the following we show a type system such that well typed pro-
cesses are provento keep their secrets. In particular,we use a conceptof secrecysimilar
to that we discussed for the spi calculus and in Section 4 for the pi calculus. We say that
a process preservesthe secrecy of a piece of data M if the process never publishes M,o r
anything that would permit the computation of M, even in interaction with an attacker.
Moreover, we think of an attacker as any process Q of the calculus, represented by the
sets of its initial capabilities (i.e. the set of names on which it is able to output, input,
encrypt, and decrypt).
The types of our type system are deﬁned by the following grammar:
Types ::= Public | Secret | CPublic[T1,...,Tn] | CSecret[T1,...,Tn]
| KPublic[T1,...,Tn] | KSecret[T1,...,Tn]
Let L range over {Public,Secret}, we will writeCL[T1,...,Tn]. We have a subtyping re-
lation that is the least reﬂexiverelation such thatCL[T1,...,Tn]≤L andKL[T1,...,Tn]≤
L. Note that we do not have Secret ≤ Public or vice versa.
Public (resp. Secret ) is the type of public (resp. secret) data. CSecret[T1,...,Tn] is
the type of a channel on which the opponent cannot send messages, and which car-
ries n-tuples with components of types Ti. Similarly, KSecret[T1,...,Tn] is the type of
an encryption key that the adversary does not have, and which is used to encrypt n-
tuples with componentsof types Ti.CPublic[T1,...,Tn] is the type of a channel on which
the opponent may send messages. The channel may be intended to carry n-tuples with
components of types Ti, but the adversary may send any data it has (that is, any public
data) along that channel. Similarly, KPublic[T1,...,Tn] is the type of an encryption key
that the opponent may have. This key is intended for encrypting n-tuples with compo-
nents of types Ti, but the adversary may encryptany data it has (that is, any public data)
under this key.
We do not show the typing rules for this process calculus (see [3]), we only discuss
the rationale of the type system.
– Any public data can be sent on a channel of type CPublic[T1,...,Tn] or Public.T h i s
use of the channel may not seem to conform to its declared type. However, it is
unavoidable, since we expect that an attacker can use the channel; moreover, it
does not cause harm from the point of view of secrecy.
– Since channels of typeCSecret[T1,...,Tn] may not be known by an attacker, we can
guarantee that only tuples with types T1,...,Tn can be sent on such a channel.
– When typing the process a(x1,.., xn).P where a is a channel of type CPublic[T1,.., Tn],
two cases arise. In the ﬁrst case input values are of type Public; in the second case
input values have the expected types T1,...,Tn. In order to typecheck the process
a(x1,...,xn).P, the type system thus checks that the process P executed after the
input is well typed in both cases.
– When reading from a channel a of typeCSecret[T1,...,Tn], the input values must be
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– Rules for encryption are similar to those for output. Any public data can be en-
cryptedundera public encryptionkey, and data of types T1,...,Tn can be encrypted
under a key of type KL[T1,...,Tn]. Dually, rules for decryption are similar to those
for input.
– Ciphertexts are always of type Public.
This type system reﬂects a binary view of secrecy, according to which the world is
divided into system and attacker, and a secret is something that the attacker does not
have. When we wish to express that a piece of data is a secret for a given set of princi-
pals, we deﬁne the system to include only the processes that represent those principals.
Note that the mechanism of group creation we discussed in Section 4, directly supports
a rich view of secrecy that does not simply divide the world in two parts. Even if that
approachdoesnot treatcryptography,we think thatthe type system with group creation
can be extended to deal also with cryptographic primitives.
Properties of the Type System. We start with a lemma that says that every process is
well-typed,atleast ina fairlytrivialwaythatmakesits freenamespublic.Thislemmais
important because it means that any process that represents an opponent is well-typed.
It is a formal counterpart to the informal idea that the type system cannot constrain the
adversary.
Lemma 2. Let P be an untyped process. If fn(P) ⊆{ a1,...,an},fv(P) ⊆{ x1,...,xm},
andTi ≤Publicforalli=1...m,thena1 :Public,...,an :Public,x1 :T1,...,xm :Tm  P.
We end with an informal statement of the secrecy theorem, see [3] for a complete for-
malization.
Theorem 11 (Secrecy). Let P be a well-typed, closed process. Then P preserves the
secrecy of names of type Secret against adversaries that can input, output, encrypt,
and decrypt on names declared Public, and output and encrypt on names declared
CPublic[...] and KPublic[...].
As an example, we can obtain a:Public,s:Secret   (νk)a {s}k,k  by letting k : KPublic
[Secret]. Then the theorem above implies that the process (νk)a {s}k,k  preserves the
secrecy of s form any opponent that can input, output, encrypt, and decrypt on a.I n
other words, if Q is a closed process and fn(Q) ⊆{ a},t h e nQ | (νk)a {s}k,k  does not
output s on a. Thus, assuming that Q does not have s in advance, Q cannot guess s or
compute it from the message on a.
7.5 Further Reading
In [6], a ﬁnal section shows how we could add to the syntax of pure spi calculus cryp-
tographic operations such as hashing, public-key encryption and digital signature.
A more general approach is that of [4], where authors introduce and study the so
called applied pi calculus, a uniform extension of the pi calculus that is parameterized
on a ﬁnite set of function symbols. Such functionscan be instantiated as data structures
(e.g. pairs) but also as cryptographic functions as hashing, (a)symmetric encryption,
probabilistic encryption, message authentication codes (MACs). The main advantage136 Michele Bugliesi et al.
of applied pi calculus is that its semantics and proof techniques represent a common
framework to reason about very different security protocols.
Beside secrecy, other security properties can be studied in the context of spi cal-
culus. As an example, see [6] for a formalization of authenticity property with testing
equivalence.
Finally, in [8,7,9] authors study the security properties of the join calculus (a vari-
ant of pi calculus with an emphasis on distributed programming [28]) enriched with
cryptography.
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